August 13, 2024 • 39 mins
The for-profit healthcare system, Steward Health, has gone bankrupt and is trying to sell off their MA hospitals to recoup some of their money. Eight hospitals in MA have been affected by the healthcare “crisis” and thus many citizens are faced with challenging circumstances for healthcare access. John McDonough, professor of the practice of public health at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health joined Dan to discuss.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:00):
It's Night Side with Dan Ray. I'm w b Z
Constance video.
Speaker 2 (00:07):
Thank you very much, Kyle was we move into the
nine o'clock hour. I'm delighted to well a guess that
I had kind of lost touch with. He was a
former is a former state representative at the State House.
I knew him in that capacity. He now works as
a professor of a practice in the area of healthcare
(00:29):
at the chan Harvard School of Public Health, Professor John McDonough.
I don't want to say what I want to say
representative of professor. We'll keep it at professor fan now,
But John, how are you welcome back?
Speaker 3 (00:41):
Welcome back. It's great to renew an old acquaintances.
Speaker 4 (00:45):
Great to be with you, Dan, and please just call
me John.
Speaker 2 (00:49):
Okay, we can leave it at that. We want to
talk about the Stewart health crisis here in Massachusetts, and
as I mentioned last night, we're going to stay with
this story because I think it's an incredibly important story.
(01:09):
Let me start off with the general question and then
we'll get to a more specific question. Is this a
crisis that is unprecedented or is this happening with other
health groups in other parts of the country.
Speaker 4 (01:28):
Well, so, there have been closings of hospitals and hospital
chains all over the country for profit a nonprofit, and
some of them have involved so called private equity financing,
and some of them just run out of gas and
(01:49):
don't have the support and the resources to survive. So
we've been seeing a shrinkage of hospitals going back at
least fifty years or even more, as as medicine gets
more complicated and specialized, and as as smaller and smaller
facilities find it harder to keep up to and to
(02:12):
maintain themselves financially and sufficient workers and otherwise.
Speaker 5 (02:17):
This is special because of the uniqueness of the story.
Speaker 4 (02:24):
A former Calcolic hospital chain that was highly respected and
loved by its patient population and its workers sold in
twenty ten to a private equity chain out of Wall
Street in New York. The private equity.
Speaker 5 (02:45):
Firm is known as Cerberus cer b E r U s.
Speaker 4 (02:50):
Cerberus is actually a Greek myth that is a three
headed dog that is supposed to be guarding the gates
of hell.
Speaker 2 (03:02):
Well, there's we could carry that metaphor a little bit.
By the way. The former chain carriedis Christie was the
Catholic hospital chain and this This was caused, probably ironically
in some part, maybe a big part, maybe a small part,
(03:22):
but at least in some part by the the priest
pedophile priest crisis that broke around the turn of the
twenty first century here, you know, and that sort of
created a need for the Catholic Church to find uh finances,
(03:42):
money to to pay victims. Am I misreading that?
Speaker 4 (03:48):
I'd say that was that was a substantial part of it.
That we we had the new archbishop and then Cardinals
Sean O'Malley come in really wanting to turn things around
and find in the archdiocese, in the Catholic Church infrastructure,
and finding that the decisions that were forced on him
(04:12):
in terms of being the owner of sophisticated chain of
acute care hospitals and other facilities was.
Speaker 5 (04:21):
Quite a distraction.
Speaker 4 (04:23):
Also, in addition to the scandal which had done real
damage to the reputation of the archdiocese, there was also
an underfunding of pensions in the archdiocese, both in the
carry tasks Christie system itself and beyond, and so the
(04:44):
archdiocese had a big problem financially in terms of needing
to invest and find the money to make up for
the short payments to its pension front. Over a good
number of years, there were some major issues both in
terms of the reputational scandal and the payments to victims,
(05:07):
but also the underfunding of the pension system and other
related issues that really came together by two thousand and five, six,
seven and eight for the archdiocese and Cardinal O'Malley to say, listen,
we've got to extricate ourselves from this. This is a
big distraction and we're really not confident to be able
(05:29):
to address all the pieces, and so looking for a solution.
And so one of their first challenges in two thousand
and eight was looking for a new president of the
system and there was a rising star surgeon at the
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center by the name of doctor
(05:50):
Ralph Delatori, who had created a super practice of cardiac
surgery at Beth Israel Deaconess, was a star started his
own center at Beth Israel, and he was interested in
looking for leadership opportunities in the health sector and applied
(06:13):
for and got the job in two thousand and eight
as the CEO and President of the Carrie cass Christie
Hospital System and took on that and a lot of
people were excited and said, this is a real burst
of electricity and energy in terms of reviving the system.
(06:35):
And then things started to turn.
Speaker 3 (06:39):
Well they were.
Speaker 2 (06:40):
We're going to start to talk about that turn, and
when we get back, we can focus on a now
very controversial ralph.
Speaker 3 (06:50):
Is it pronounced dilatory? Is that the correct tranciation?
Speaker 4 (06:52):
Ralph delatory deleatory?
Speaker 2 (06:54):
Okay, who I guess spent part of the Olympics on
his yacht and part of his Olympics at Versailles, watching
some of the drissage equine equestrian competition, which we'll talk about,
And I also just want to talk about invite folks
if they'd like to join the conversation.
Speaker 3 (07:15):
I think John.
Speaker 2 (07:17):
I don't want to say that he knows this better
than anyone, but I think there are a few people
who would know it better than John McDonough, and I'm
delighted that he's been able to join us tonight. So
I will give the number just quickly six one seven, two, five,
four ten thirty or six one seven, nine three one
ten thirty. John has been kind of indicate they'll be
happy to take phone calls and try to answer questions.
I know a lot of you have questions. That's why
(07:39):
I'm doing this. I feel it's important for our audience.
We talked about it for an hour and a half
last night, but John is so much better versed in
this than I am. I am indubted to him for
being available tonight to answer some of my questions in
your questions.
Speaker 3 (07:53):
My name is Dan Ray. This is Nightside. We will
be right back after these messages.
Speaker 1 (07:59):
Now back to Dan Ray live from the Window World
night Side Studios on WBZ News Radio.
Speaker 2 (08:06):
Joining us is Professor John McDonald, former state representative from
the Boston area. He has been with the chan Harvard
School of Public Health since twenty eleven, so he has
been observing this process before we go to phone calls.
Just a couple of things. We talked today a little
(08:27):
bit about what has been going on. And you basically
feel that the doctor Delatory is a villain in this story.
Not trying to put words in your mouth, but I
think you made a comparison today. If you want to
(08:48):
share that with the audience or tell me, tell me
how how you feel about his role as honestly as
you cannot appreciate it.
Speaker 4 (08:57):
Well, So, doctor Delatory is the person who made the
relationship to take the Carrycoss Christie chain in twenty ten
and turn it into Steward Health owned by the Serberus
private equity firm, and turning it into a for profit
(09:22):
hospital system, which really was a financial toy for the
serverist folks from New York.
Speaker 5 (09:32):
Private equity is a.
Speaker 4 (09:34):
Controversial financing vehicle in the United States and around the world,
especially in the United States, and it's especially dangerous when
it gets involved in healthcare and medical care because the
heart and soul of medicine is that the patient comes first,
that it's about the patient relationship and their needs. And
(09:56):
the heart and soul of private equity is that profits
are first for the central shareholders, and everything else comes second, third, fourth,
or doesn't even make the list. And so there is
a fundamental contradiction here in terms of the values of
what private equity is and what most of us see
(10:18):
as essential about our health and medical care system. And
so Ralph by putting it in the hands of a
private equity firm, and then after the Attorney General stopped
watching in twenty fifteen, basically took all of the real
estate in that the former car Carrie Tusk Christie Chain
(10:41):
held the buildings the land for all of the eight
hospitals and basically sold all of the real estate to
another financial firm, kind of firm called a retri t
of state investment trust. And they basically pay the Cerberus
(11:07):
folks a large amount of money in exchange for getting
all their property. And now they're the landlord. And so
the folks at Saint Elizabeth's, the folks at Good Samaritan
and Brockton no longer own the building and land on
which their facility resides and have to actually pay exorbitant
(11:28):
rental payments way way way into the future that take
away from the money. And meanwhile, most of the proceeds
from the sale of the land and property go to
the reach the real estate investment trust. And this is
a formula, This is a process which basically kind of
(11:49):
bled this system dry and precipitated what is now the
bankruptcy and as we speak the dissolution of this shame.
We hope it may lead to a better place, but
we have no guarantee of that at all, because we
still have these Wall Street firms that are calling all
(12:10):
the shots.
Speaker 2 (12:10):
Well, we have two hospitals which we know are going
to close, including Corning Hospital, which is a bedrock of
the Dorchester community.
Speaker 3 (12:20):
And there's another hospital in Heir which.
Speaker 5 (12:22):
Is about Nashoba Valley, closed.
Speaker 3 (12:25):
By the end of the month.
Speaker 2 (12:25):
And then there's another five or six hospitals which are
in jeopardy of closing. I know that there was a
deal today of a sale of there I guess the doctors.
What's called stewardship five thousand employed and affiliated physicians in
(12:46):
Massachusetts and nine other states.
Speaker 3 (12:49):
This is a huge deal. That deal was.
Speaker 2 (12:51):
Two hundred and forty five million dollars. I don't know
how they sell doctors, but that's apparently we're with the
regulators here in Massachusetts. When all of this hijinks was
going on, I mean, someone should have at some point
been saying, slow this process down.
Speaker 3 (13:11):
What are we getting into? Who's involved here? Where were there?
Speaker 6 (13:16):
So the.
Speaker 4 (13:18):
Carrie TuS Christy chain was sold to Cerberus to become
steward in twenty ten, and it had to be approved
by the Attorney General. Then Martha Cokeley was the Attorney
General at the time, and when she approved it, because
the archdiocese was bleeding and needed the revenue.
Speaker 5 (13:42):
To come from the sale and they wanted out of it.
And there were.
Speaker 4 (13:46):
Literally no other institutions in Greater Boston or Massachusetts that
came forward and said, yeah, we would like to take
over ownership and responsibility of this. So Cerberus was kind
of the only player in town that was willing to
come forward, and so we have a lot of public process,
(14:09):
a lot of public hearings. Martha Cokeley allowed the sale
to go forward and it became Steward under Cerberus. That
and that arrangement then had five years of close financial
monitoring by the Attorney General's office. One of my former
(14:32):
colleagues at the Harvard School of Public Health, Professor Nancy Kane,
was the actual financial monitor and she paid very close
attention and gave a lot of oversight and informed the
Attorney General of everything going on for five years. But
the deal was only oversight for five years, and then
(14:53):
once the oversight ended in twenty fifteen, then Stewart and
Cerberus were free to go their own way, and that's
when they sold the real estate out from under the
institutions and started the process of just Senator Elizabeth Warrenkat
and Senator Marky call it the looting of this This
(15:17):
former hospital chain and so so, so that's that's one
piece and you can look at it stage by stage
and see the process.
Speaker 5 (15:29):
But it was after the five.
Speaker 4 (15:30):
Years of oversight things really started to go south in
terms of what was going on in that system.
Speaker 2 (15:36):
So once the five years of oversight ended, at that
point some of us was able to do whatever they want.
There was there was no regulation and whatsoever, no oversight.
Speaker 4 (15:47):
There actually was. We do have we do have a
healthcare financial Oversight group called it's called CHIA CHIA, which
is a Center for Health Information and as it's a
wonderful agency and every acute care hospital and like Stewart,
(16:07):
has to provide extensive financial information every single year. And
for the first five years they provided that information and
once they were out from under the thumb of the
Attorney General and were free, they stopped providing any information.
And SIA actually took Stewart to court and has been
(16:32):
unable to get resolution in terms of that action. So
it's been about eight to nine years now where they
have done no financial reporting to the state as they
are legally required to do, and so there are definitely
issues the are in terms of what went wrong that
(16:53):
they could get away with this, and the legislature right
now is trying to toughen that loss so that we'll
never see a situation like that again.
Speaker 2 (17:01):
That should have been a huge red flag. I guess
they refused to file financial reports with Massachusetts regulators for
years before moving the headquarters from Boston to Dallas in
twenty eighteen. Try not thriling your tax returns with the
irs and see how long you can get away with that,
(17:22):
real quick, if I could, how much did seahbus pay
for this whole shooting match back in twenty ten?
Speaker 3 (17:30):
Approximately?
Speaker 4 (17:31):
If you know, I'm forgetting the number I can that
I can find out and get it back to you
who have no.
Speaker 5 (17:38):
Problem, no public I don't remember. So then after.
Speaker 2 (17:41):
Five years twenty fifteen, at that point, that from twenty
ten to twenty fifteen covers the governorships of Governor Deval
Patrick into the first term of.
Speaker 3 (17:53):
The Baker administration.
Speaker 2 (17:56):
And did the Baker administration drop the ball in not
providing whatever oversight was necessary after this five year period expired.
It just seems to me that this company, all of
a sudden, it was the inmates running the asylum. After
the five years were up, they behaved themselves for five years,
(18:18):
and after five years they thumb their those that the
State of Massachusetts regulators.
Speaker 4 (18:23):
I mean, just I'll tell you so. In in twenty ten,
a Cerberus paid eight hundred and ninety five million dollars
to buy the carry Task System.
Speaker 2 (18:35):
Okay, what is its value today? If any I know
it's invasorancy proceeedings, but.
Speaker 5 (18:41):
It has its value today.
Speaker 4 (18:43):
I haven't seen any really good. So nobody's looking at
the value of the whole chain right now because it's
being broken up piece by piece. And some places like
you have Norton Hospital that had Norwood Hospital that has
been closed.
Speaker 3 (19:00):
For that was hit that was hit with a flood.
Speaker 2 (19:02):
Okay, so so so I'll give them a break on
that right that was hit by a flood. But you
have these other hospitals. I don't understand how hospitals go
out of business, to be really honest with you, it
seems to me whenever I've known anyone going to a hospital,
you get you get charged for everything down to an aspirin,
(19:25):
and you know, which is understandable, but.
Speaker 3 (19:30):
Boy, what a what a mess. John.
Speaker 2 (19:31):
Let's take a break. I want to open up the
phone lines. Give folks there's a couple of folks waiting.
If not, we'll open up phone calls. You've explained this
extraordinarily well. Obviously, this is a lack of oversight and nobody,
nobody identified this problem. It's like I just came back
from Pompeii in Italy. It's it's almost as if you're
(19:56):
next to Mount Vesuvius and you say, you know, I
got a bad feeling here that this thing might erupt.
This is our own little monk Vesuvius without the lava
here in Massachusetts, because it's going to affect a lot
of people adversely. Six one seven two thirty six one
seven nine thirty. My guest is Professor John McDonough. He
(20:20):
is a professor of the Practice of healthcare at the
Harvard chan School of Public Health. He knows this situation
very well. He's explained it extraordinarily well. Uh, and we'll
take some more questions. I have plenty of questions, but
I want to open it up for you to get
an opportunity to spark to speak with Professor McDonough. Not
(20:41):
only where we go from here, how did we get here?
And is there any resolution that might that just might
provide a good solution or a livable solution here in Massachusetts.
It looks to me like this is a train work,
a train wreck in slow motion. Hopefully John McDonough will
(21:02):
be able to convince me that that characterization is incorrect
once we get back right after the news at the
bottom of the hour.
Speaker 3 (21:09):
My name is Dan Ray. This is Nightside.
Speaker 1 (21:12):
Night Side with Dan Ray on Boston's news radio.
Speaker 2 (21:18):
My guest is doctor John McDonough was with the Cham
School of Public Health at Harvard University. Doctor McDonough, I
want to go to phone calls. We've had people holding
on here, so I've got a whole bunch of questions.
But you have explained this so well. My last question
(21:38):
before we go to break, so if all of this
happened in twenty and fifteen and the oversight was withdrawn
by the regulators. Governor Baker was in charge of the
state at the time, he was running for well, he
(21:58):
was still really in his first He started in twenty fourteen.
Speaker 5 (22:02):
He started twenty fifteen.
Speaker 3 (22:04):
This was twenty fifteen, I know that, but start he.
Speaker 5 (22:06):
Got elected in fourteen until so he.
Speaker 2 (22:09):
Was he came on board as this thing was starting
to become what was lacking regulation oversight.
Speaker 3 (22:18):
Was he where what was going on?
Speaker 4 (22:22):
I have not heard him explicitly say what he knew
and what he didn't know. We know that he was
paying attention, particularly his Health and Human Service Secretary Mary
lou Sutter's was paying attention to it. There is a
desire on the part of the administration and the state
(22:44):
to not want to intervene in the affairs of a
for profits system that has lots of sources of financing
on its own, and so there's an interest in making
sure that patient care is appropriate and up the snuff.
And uh and Ralph was a good salesman. Ralph DELLATORI
(23:08):
the the CEO of the system, and did a lot
of a lot of letting, you know, put putting forward
a good story about what was happening.
Speaker 5 (23:21):
And uh and uh.
Speaker 4 (23:23):
There there were so many challenges, you know, just talk
about you know, Governor Baker and the m bt A
and all of those are just just for starters. So
so and and I'd say this is true of Governor
Heally today.
Speaker 5 (23:35):
There's not there's not.
Speaker 4 (23:36):
A desire to have to take taxpayer money in Massachusetts
and use it to prop up or rescue a for
profit system like this and so, and so you can
look back and hindsight is just a wonderful gift to have.
But you know, there was this expectation that they had
(23:59):
enough resource verses that they would be able to work
it out and sustain themselves. And that turned out to
be tragically incorrect, because I think there was a misjudgment
about doctor delator and what his game was and what
he was really about.
Speaker 2 (24:12):
Did did Governor Baker have a relationship with doctor Delatora?
I mean, governors tend to know the moves and shakers
in our society. Was there any interaction between the two
of them.
Speaker 4 (24:23):
Yeah, from the best of my knowledge, there there was
an interaction and and uh uh uh and doctor Delatoria
would talk directly to the governor, and so yeah, I
think I think there was there was a relationship. And uh,
you know, I don't know. I don't have precise information
on how deeply the state leadership engaged because they had
(24:47):
many other challenges and and didn't see that it was
their job to come in and uh, the heavy handed
monitor of a for profit system.
Speaker 3 (24:59):
All right, let's get the phone calls. Six.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
Let me go start it off with Robert Is in Quincy, Massachusetts.
Let him get to Robert. First off, Robert, you were
first up with Professor John McDonald.
Speaker 3 (25:13):
What's your comment of question?
Speaker 7 (25:16):
This is a loaded one. My first comment is, having
worked in the healthcare field, we all know about Stewart.
We know about the chairman. He has a nice, big boat.
He has profit. It's all about profit and it's too
good to be true. Charlie Baker worked as an executive
(25:37):
for haved Kilgrim. He knew all about health care. He did.
Speaker 8 (25:44):
And we want to go back one more. We have
comforts health care Potter Stewart, and they shut it down.
Seventy thousand people, patients like myself. We're out and about
without doctors. Now let's go over to Nowen Hospital. The
hospital has a flood. They stop building the hospitals. Then
all of a sudden they stop in their tracks because
(26:07):
it's going to cost them money. And the Connie's one.
I live in North Quincy. There are people in dorchesterday
desperately need that hospital.
Speaker 2 (26:16):
We know that, Robert. But what I'm trying to do is, well, Robert,
stop yelling at.
Speaker 7 (26:23):
Us, Okay, sleep for me.
Speaker 3 (26:24):
I favor take his audio down. Robert, if you want
to ask a question.
Speaker 2 (26:28):
If you want to have a conversation with Professor McDonough,
that would be great. But I didn't bring him on
here as a guest to listen to people yell at him.
So do you have a question for Professor McDonough, Go ahead.
Speaker 7 (26:41):
Robert, Professor McDonough and also a state rep. I listened
to you and Dan Wright. I have a lot of
respect for both of you. Well, what I don't have
a respect for somebody's sleeping at the wheel and what
do I mean? And this is the question. You stated
that when they came off this uh receivership or whatever
(27:04):
you want to call it, nobody did nothing. Now, shlie Baker.
Speaker 2 (27:09):
It wasn't receive It wasn't a receiver, David. Let's you've
already made that point. Let's if there's a question, great,
If not, I'm going to go to some callers.
Speaker 3 (27:18):
We have a question. Go ahead, Robert, if there's.
Speaker 8 (27:20):
John, tell me why nobody took the time and effort
to hold a finger in the damn It's all about profit?
Speaker 3 (27:31):
Okay, do you want to make your speech? Thanks very
much for you call. Robert.
Speaker 2 (27:34):
I didn't perceive a question there. You want to comment
on his his screed John, I.
Speaker 4 (27:40):
Would just say that I totally resonate and respect and
feel his anger.
Speaker 7 (27:45):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (27:46):
And he mentioned Norwood, he mentioned Compass, he mentioned Carnie.
He also could have mentioned Quincy Hospital, which which Ralph
Delatori took under Stewart's wing and then ended up closing it.
The speaker of the House, Ron Mariano, will never forgive
(28:06):
that because he feels like he was personally misled about
the situation and about what would be done, and thought
he had promises that Quincy would stay open and it
wasn't true. So I think Robert's anger, I resonate with it,
I feel it, and I feel like there are people
all over Greater Boston who have a similar feelings.
Speaker 5 (28:29):
There's a lot of betrayal that kind of doesn't come
out in the.
Speaker 4 (28:35):
Discussion about chapter eleven and bankruptcy. But I just I
want Robert to know I think his anger and his
frustration are totally justified.
Speaker 3 (28:44):
Yep, okay.
Speaker 2 (28:45):
As I said, I was doing my best to get
a question, but we didn't. We got we did get
his anger and frustration very clearly. We'll take a break.
We have a couple of lines at six, one, seven, nine, thirty,
going to go to Joe and Lynn Joe in Plymouth,
Mark and North End Over Ladies feel free to jump
on board as well. Coming back on Night's Side with
Professor John McDonald of the Harvard Chant School of Public Health.
Speaker 1 (29:06):
Right after this, Now back to Dan Ray live from
the Window World Night Side Studios. I'm WBZ News Radio.
Speaker 2 (29:15):
Okay, I'm going to look folks because of my tough
time with Robert there questions. You got a question you've
been waiting, I'll give you an opportunity.
Speaker 3 (29:23):
Let's have at it. Let me go to Joe. Joe,
you're on with professor.
Speaker 9 (29:27):
Hey, Dan, thank you very much, and this is an
excellent subject, Robert. I hope that when we're off the
air we give a number to get in contact with you.
Have a few things I'm want to say.
Speaker 2 (29:36):
You know what we don't We don't We're not doing
connections here. Joe, I have a guest. If you want
to ask a question. Have I move on to someone's
going to ask my guest a question?
Speaker 9 (29:44):
Go ahead, Joe, Yes, I did. My question is can
we put the hospitals back the way they used to be?
Because Saint Elizabeth used to be a good hospital now
I know someone that went there is having a lot
of problems with it, and other hospitals they've gone down
the tubes, and I'm disappointed in Stewart and Lynn hospitals
closed like your comments on that.
Speaker 2 (30:04):
Okay, John, is there any hope here or is hope
you know slim and none and Slim is just left town.
Speaker 4 (30:10):
I think it is possible, It is possible that we
can come out of this, and not for every institution,
but for most of them in a better situation than
we were in under Stuart. There are, in fact, and
it's not it's not public, and so I can't I
can't say who's gonna do it, but there are for
(30:34):
at least about five or six of the institutions, there
are Massachusetts based nonprofit and community based hospitals that are
looking to acquire one or the other of the Stuart hospitals.
Speaker 5 (30:54):
And so that is a that if.
Speaker 4 (30:57):
That plays out the way that people are saying beneath
the surface, that could be a real positive, and we could.
Speaker 5 (31:05):
We wouldn't.
Speaker 4 (31:06):
We won't go back to a carry toss Christy chain.
That's just not going to happen. There's no one in
a position to do that, but some of our our
real solid community based institutions are we understand stepping forward
and have made bids and we think that that's the
direction that a lot of this is going to go,
So we could end up in a better place.
Speaker 2 (31:26):
So potentially without telling us who might be involved, are
we talking about something that might resolve itself within a
month or within a year?
Speaker 4 (31:37):
This is short term? Yeah, no, this this this would
be this would be settled relatively quickly, and the state
will be playing an important supportive role in providing some
advanced financing to help make these deals and arrangements move forward.
So yeah, and regarding Lynn Hospital, I still believe it
(31:58):
was a real.
Speaker 5 (31:59):
Tragedy that Lynn lost.
Speaker 4 (32:00):
It's only the hut Care Hospital and yeah, that's but
understand what's been going on since the early.
Speaker 5 (32:08):
Nineteen nineties Massachusetts.
Speaker 4 (32:11):
And this is back when I was in the legislature
and I opposed it, but Massachusetts made a decision to
say we are done with state regulation in terms of
trying to determine the fate of the hospital system in Massachusetts.
We think that the market is a better way to
do it. And so we've really had about thirty years
(32:31):
of having the market much more involved in the fate
of our hospitals rather than community planning and really trying
to understand the need and have government play a proactive role.
In the nineties, we sort of had this idea, Oh,
government always messes it up. We can't rely on government,
and I think we're paying the price for that politics
(32:55):
policy decision more than thirty years ago.
Speaker 2 (32:58):
Now, all right, Joe, good question, Joe. I got others
that want to get to Okay, appreciate it.
Speaker 3 (33:04):
Question. Good night, market, north end of the market. You
got to be quick for me. Go right ahead.
Speaker 6 (33:09):
You're all with Dan doctor. Thank you, Dan doctor, thank
you for the time. Uh, the long story short. I
know servers well, I know truere quite well. They're a client.
I ran the technology for them. The question is where
does the tough love come from here? Everybody expects that
when they call nine one one, they're going to the
(33:31):
best in care. That's not that's no longer possible. Where
does the tough love come from here?
Speaker 4 (33:40):
The immediate tough love is that is that every acute
care hospital operates under a license issued by the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health, and so when something goes awry,
when something goes wrong.
Speaker 2 (33:56):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (33:57):
The first place is what is the Department of Public
Health understand and what are they doing? They are kind
of the boots on the ground, the first people in there,
and in fact, throughout this whole crisis, since it emerged
about six months ago at the start of the year
of the Department of Public Health has in fact had
(34:17):
monitors and observers in every one of these steward facilities
just to make sure that the quality of care is
at the level that people have a right to expect
it to be so.
Speaker 5 (34:30):
But there are higher levels as well.
Speaker 4 (34:32):
There's something called the Massachusetts Policy Commission, which has some
really terrific people that do financial analysis and understanding. So yeah,
there are a lot of different players involved in this,
but Department of Public Health is the go to entity
in terms of immediate reaction and oversight.
Speaker 2 (34:53):
Mark, great question. I appreciate it very much. Thank you,
Thank you, sir. Let me go next to Uh. I'm
going to go to John in debthim. John, you got
to be quick, but getting tight on time with Professor
John McDonald.
Speaker 10 (35:05):
Go ahead, John, Okay, I'll be very quick. I'm a
little biased. I was born I said, Elizabeth. My mother
worked there for twenty five years. But my question is
you mentioned that they the Stewart sold the real estate
after they purchased the hospital chain. Is that accurate?
Speaker 3 (35:18):
Yes?
Speaker 10 (35:18):
And then when they did that, who profited from that individually?
And can anybody be held criminally responsible for this whole thing?
And I'll listen to you, gentlemen, thank you.
Speaker 3 (35:27):
Okay, well, good question, go ahead.
Speaker 4 (35:29):
Yeah, it's a great it's a great question. I'll just
tell you that what they did. So in twenty sixteen,
Cerberus and Steward sold all the real estate to this
reach real estate investment trust called Medical Properties Trust down
in Atlanta, and they took the money. A lot of
(35:50):
it went straight into Cerberus's pocket, about five hundred million
uh and some of it Ralph Tellatory, the president of
the CEO of Stewart, used it to go on a
buying spree of other hospitals around the country with the
money from the real estate, so that by the year
(36:11):
twenty twenty before everything crashed, Steward was the largest for
profit hospital chain in the entire country. Out of nothing
very quickly. So basically they took the money and they
went on a buying spree. And now it's all crashing
all around them.
Speaker 2 (36:29):
Now in twenty twenty, it seems to me that there
would have been a lot of people going to hospitals
for COVID related problems, and that that would have made
hospitals more valuable. And how hospitals run out of money
or put themselves out of business is beyond me. I
have never gone to a hospital, looked at a bill
and said, Wow, they only charged me so much.
Speaker 3 (36:51):
What's going on?
Speaker 2 (36:52):
John?
Speaker 4 (36:53):
So the big money for her hospital for acute care
hospitals and surgeries, and in the COVID crisis, they had
to suspend a lot of their surgeries. So the only
reason most of them didn't go bankrupt during COVID was
because the federal government came in and just smothered them
(37:15):
in federal cash to tie them over during this period
where they couldn't do it. And then they came out
of that and they came back into relatively healthy shape
where they are for the most part now.
Speaker 5 (37:28):
But COVID was not a.
Speaker 4 (37:31):
Financial boon for the institutions at all.
Speaker 2 (37:34):
I'm going to try to steal one more minute. Rob
and Dan and I want to become in a Bob
in Brockton. Bob you late. I got only a minute
for you. What can you do.
Speaker 11 (37:44):
I'll make it quick. I'll make you quick. The question
to John is it looks like this is a profit
type thing. Where is it leave the County Hospital? The
County Hospital really serves in between bars. It's been in
social hospital. We really can't afford to close its matter
of fact, my doctor is a specialist in gastrology. Because
(38:09):
the hospital is closing. Yep, he's retiring.
Speaker 2 (38:12):
Okay, we got it, Bob, Bob, we got the question.
I think you're not going to be happy with the answer.
The Connie Hospital is due to close the end of
this month. Am I correct on that?
Speaker 3 (38:20):
John?
Speaker 4 (38:21):
That is correct, And I think there's a lot of
people who are very angry and upset about that. It's
a tough judgment called by the Heally administration. I think
they need to do a better job coming out and
explaining everything that went into that decision.
Speaker 2 (38:35):
Bob, not the answer you wanted, but it's a straight answer.
Thank you, my friend, Thank you, John McDonough, Thank you
for your time tonight. A great explanation. Whether people like
the answers or not, that's the reality.
Speaker 3 (38:50):
John. Love to have you back. Let's keep in touch.
Speaker 4 (38:52):
Okay, great to be with you, Dan, thanks for keeping
me on. It's great to connect with you.
Speaker 3 (38:57):
My pleasure, my pleasure. Thank you very much.
Speaker 2 (39:00):
When we get back, if you want to keep talking
about this light, the lines up. If not, we're going
to talk about bike lanes in Boston. Coming back on
Night Side right after the ten
It's Night Side with Dan Ray. I'm w b Z
Constance video.
Speaker 2 (00:07):
Thank you very much, Kyle was we move into the
nine o'clock hour. I'm delighted to well a guess that
I had kind of lost touch with. He was a
former is a former state representative at the State House.
I knew him in that capacity. He now works as
a professor of a practice in the area of healthcare
(00:29):
at the chan Harvard School of Public Health, Professor John McDonough.
I don't want to say what I want to say
representative of professor. We'll keep it at professor fan now,
But John, how are you welcome back?
Speaker 3 (00:41):
Welcome back. It's great to renew an old acquaintances.
Speaker 4 (00:45):
Great to be with you, Dan, and please just call
me John.
Speaker 2 (00:49):
Okay, we can leave it at that. We want to
talk about the Stewart health crisis here in Massachusetts, and
as I mentioned last night, we're going to stay with
this story because I think it's an incredibly important story.
(01:09):
Let me start off with the general question and then
we'll get to a more specific question. Is this a
crisis that is unprecedented or is this happening with other
health groups in other parts of the country.
Speaker 4 (01:28):
Well, so, there have been closings of hospitals and hospital
chains all over the country for profit a nonprofit, and
some of them have involved so called private equity financing,
and some of them just run out of gas and
(01:49):
don't have the support and the resources to survive. So
we've been seeing a shrinkage of hospitals going back at
least fifty years or even more, as as medicine gets
more complicated and specialized, and as as smaller and smaller
facilities find it harder to keep up to and to
(02:12):
maintain themselves financially and sufficient workers and otherwise.
Speaker 5 (02:17):
This is special because of the uniqueness of the story.
Speaker 4 (02:24):
A former Calcolic hospital chain that was highly respected and
loved by its patient population and its workers sold in
twenty ten to a private equity chain out of Wall
Street in New York. The private equity.
Speaker 5 (02:45):
Firm is known as Cerberus cer b E r U s.
Speaker 4 (02:50):
Cerberus is actually a Greek myth that is a three
headed dog that is supposed to be guarding the gates
of hell.
Speaker 2 (03:02):
Well, there's we could carry that metaphor a little bit.
By the way. The former chain carriedis Christie was the
Catholic hospital chain and this This was caused, probably ironically
in some part, maybe a big part, maybe a small part,
(03:22):
but at least in some part by the the priest
pedophile priest crisis that broke around the turn of the
twenty first century here, you know, and that sort of
created a need for the Catholic Church to find uh finances,
(03:42):
money to to pay victims. Am I misreading that?
Speaker 4 (03:48):
I'd say that was that was a substantial part of it.
That we we had the new archbishop and then Cardinals
Sean O'Malley come in really wanting to turn things around
and find in the archdiocese, in the Catholic Church infrastructure,
and finding that the decisions that were forced on him
(04:12):
in terms of being the owner of sophisticated chain of
acute care hospitals and other facilities was.
Speaker 5 (04:21):
Quite a distraction.
Speaker 4 (04:23):
Also, in addition to the scandal which had done real
damage to the reputation of the archdiocese, there was also
an underfunding of pensions in the archdiocese, both in the
carry tasks Christie system itself and beyond, and so the
(04:44):
archdiocese had a big problem financially in terms of needing
to invest and find the money to make up for
the short payments to its pension front. Over a good
number of years, there were some major issues both in
terms of the reputational scandal and the payments to victims,
(05:07):
but also the underfunding of the pension system and other
related issues that really came together by two thousand and five, six,
seven and eight for the archdiocese and Cardinal O'Malley to say, listen,
we've got to extricate ourselves from this. This is a
big distraction and we're really not confident to be able
(05:29):
to address all the pieces, and so looking for a solution.
And so one of their first challenges in two thousand
and eight was looking for a new president of the
system and there was a rising star surgeon at the
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center by the name of doctor
(05:50):
Ralph Delatori, who had created a super practice of cardiac
surgery at Beth Israel Deaconess, was a star started his
own center at Beth Israel, and he was interested in
looking for leadership opportunities in the health sector and applied
(06:13):
for and got the job in two thousand and eight
as the CEO and President of the Carrie cass Christie
Hospital System and took on that and a lot of
people were excited and said, this is a real burst
of electricity and energy in terms of reviving the system.
(06:35):
And then things started to turn.
Speaker 3 (06:39):
Well they were.
Speaker 2 (06:40):
We're going to start to talk about that turn, and
when we get back, we can focus on a now
very controversial ralph.
Speaker 3 (06:50):
Is it pronounced dilatory? Is that the correct tranciation?
Speaker 4 (06:52):
Ralph delatory deleatory?
Speaker 2 (06:54):
Okay, who I guess spent part of the Olympics on
his yacht and part of his Olympics at Versailles, watching
some of the drissage equine equestrian competition, which we'll talk about,
And I also just want to talk about invite folks
if they'd like to join the conversation.
Speaker 3 (07:15):
I think John.
Speaker 2 (07:17):
I don't want to say that he knows this better
than anyone, but I think there are a few people
who would know it better than John McDonough, and I'm
delighted that he's been able to join us tonight. So
I will give the number just quickly six one seven, two, five,
four ten thirty or six one seven, nine three one
ten thirty. John has been kind of indicate they'll be
happy to take phone calls and try to answer questions.
I know a lot of you have questions. That's why
(07:39):
I'm doing this. I feel it's important for our audience.
We talked about it for an hour and a half
last night, but John is so much better versed in
this than I am. I am indubted to him for
being available tonight to answer some of my questions in
your questions.
Speaker 3 (07:53):
My name is Dan Ray. This is Nightside. We will
be right back after these messages.
Speaker 1 (07:59):
Now back to Dan Ray live from the Window World
night Side Studios on WBZ News Radio.
Speaker 2 (08:06):
Joining us is Professor John McDonald, former state representative from
the Boston area. He has been with the chan Harvard
School of Public Health since twenty eleven, so he has
been observing this process before we go to phone calls.
Just a couple of things. We talked today a little
(08:27):
bit about what has been going on. And you basically
feel that the doctor Delatory is a villain in this story.
Not trying to put words in your mouth, but I
think you made a comparison today. If you want to
(08:48):
share that with the audience or tell me, tell me
how how you feel about his role as honestly as
you cannot appreciate it.
Speaker 4 (08:57):
Well, So, doctor Delatory is the person who made the
relationship to take the Carrycoss Christie chain in twenty ten
and turn it into Steward Health owned by the Serberus
private equity firm, and turning it into a for profit
(09:22):
hospital system, which really was a financial toy for the
serverist folks from New York.
Speaker 5 (09:32):
Private equity is a.
Speaker 4 (09:34):
Controversial financing vehicle in the United States and around the world,
especially in the United States, and it's especially dangerous when
it gets involved in healthcare and medical care because the
heart and soul of medicine is that the patient comes first,
that it's about the patient relationship and their needs. And
(09:56):
the heart and soul of private equity is that profits
are first for the central shareholders, and everything else comes second, third, fourth,
or doesn't even make the list. And so there is
a fundamental contradiction here in terms of the values of
what private equity is and what most of us see
(10:18):
as essential about our health and medical care system. And
so Ralph by putting it in the hands of a
private equity firm, and then after the Attorney General stopped
watching in twenty fifteen, basically took all of the real
estate in that the former car Carrie Tusk Christie Chain
(10:41):
held the buildings the land for all of the eight
hospitals and basically sold all of the real estate to
another financial firm, kind of firm called a retri t
of state investment trust. And they basically pay the Cerberus
(11:07):
folks a large amount of money in exchange for getting
all their property. And now they're the landlord. And so
the folks at Saint Elizabeth's, the folks at Good Samaritan
and Brockton no longer own the building and land on
which their facility resides and have to actually pay exorbitant
(11:28):
rental payments way way way into the future that take
away from the money. And meanwhile, most of the proceeds
from the sale of the land and property go to
the reach the real estate investment trust. And this is
a formula, This is a process which basically kind of
(11:49):
bled this system dry and precipitated what is now the
bankruptcy and as we speak the dissolution of this shame.
We hope it may lead to a better place, but
we have no guarantee of that at all, because we
still have these Wall Street firms that are calling all
(12:10):
the shots.
Speaker 2 (12:10):
Well, we have two hospitals which we know are going
to close, including Corning Hospital, which is a bedrock of
the Dorchester community.
Speaker 3 (12:20):
And there's another hospital in Heir which.
Speaker 5 (12:22):
Is about Nashoba Valley, closed.
Speaker 3 (12:25):
By the end of the month.
Speaker 2 (12:25):
And then there's another five or six hospitals which are
in jeopardy of closing. I know that there was a
deal today of a sale of there I guess the doctors.
What's called stewardship five thousand employed and affiliated physicians in
(12:46):
Massachusetts and nine other states.
Speaker 3 (12:49):
This is a huge deal. That deal was.
Speaker 2 (12:51):
Two hundred and forty five million dollars. I don't know
how they sell doctors, but that's apparently we're with the
regulators here in Massachusetts. When all of this hijinks was
going on, I mean, someone should have at some point
been saying, slow this process down.
Speaker 3 (13:11):
What are we getting into? Who's involved here? Where were there?
Speaker 6 (13:16):
So the.
Speaker 4 (13:18):
Carrie TuS Christy chain was sold to Cerberus to become
steward in twenty ten, and it had to be approved
by the Attorney General. Then Martha Cokeley was the Attorney
General at the time, and when she approved it, because
the archdiocese was bleeding and needed the revenue.
Speaker 5 (13:42):
To come from the sale and they wanted out of it.
And there were.
Speaker 4 (13:46):
Literally no other institutions in Greater Boston or Massachusetts that
came forward and said, yeah, we would like to take
over ownership and responsibility of this. So Cerberus was kind
of the only player in town that was willing to
come forward, and so we have a lot of public process,
(14:09):
a lot of public hearings. Martha Cokeley allowed the sale
to go forward and it became Steward under Cerberus. That
and that arrangement then had five years of close financial
monitoring by the Attorney General's office. One of my former
(14:32):
colleagues at the Harvard School of Public Health, Professor Nancy Kane,
was the actual financial monitor and she paid very close
attention and gave a lot of oversight and informed the
Attorney General of everything going on for five years. But
the deal was only oversight for five years, and then
(14:53):
once the oversight ended in twenty fifteen, then Stewart and
Cerberus were free to go their own way, and that's
when they sold the real estate out from under the
institutions and started the process of just Senator Elizabeth Warrenkat
and Senator Marky call it the looting of this This
(15:17):
former hospital chain and so so, so that's that's one
piece and you can look at it stage by stage
and see the process.
Speaker 5 (15:29):
But it was after the five.
Speaker 4 (15:30):
Years of oversight things really started to go south in
terms of what was going on in that system.
Speaker 2 (15:36):
So once the five years of oversight ended, at that
point some of us was able to do whatever they want.
There was there was no regulation and whatsoever, no oversight.
Speaker 4 (15:47):
There actually was. We do have we do have a
healthcare financial Oversight group called it's called CHIA CHIA, which
is a Center for Health Information and as it's a
wonderful agency and every acute care hospital and like Stewart,
(16:07):
has to provide extensive financial information every single year. And
for the first five years they provided that information and
once they were out from under the thumb of the
Attorney General and were free, they stopped providing any information.
And SIA actually took Stewart to court and has been
(16:32):
unable to get resolution in terms of that action. So
it's been about eight to nine years now where they
have done no financial reporting to the state as they
are legally required to do, and so there are definitely
issues the are in terms of what went wrong that
(16:53):
they could get away with this, and the legislature right
now is trying to toughen that loss so that we'll
never see a situation like that again.
Speaker 2 (17:01):
That should have been a huge red flag. I guess
they refused to file financial reports with Massachusetts regulators for
years before moving the headquarters from Boston to Dallas in
twenty eighteen. Try not thriling your tax returns with the
irs and see how long you can get away with that,
(17:22):
real quick, if I could, how much did seahbus pay
for this whole shooting match back in twenty ten?
Speaker 3 (17:30):
Approximately?
Speaker 4 (17:31):
If you know, I'm forgetting the number I can that
I can find out and get it back to you
who have no.
Speaker 5 (17:38):
Problem, no public I don't remember. So then after.
Speaker 2 (17:41):
Five years twenty fifteen, at that point, that from twenty
ten to twenty fifteen covers the governorships of Governor Deval
Patrick into the first term of.
Speaker 3 (17:53):
The Baker administration.
Speaker 2 (17:56):
And did the Baker administration drop the ball in not
providing whatever oversight was necessary after this five year period expired.
It just seems to me that this company, all of
a sudden, it was the inmates running the asylum. After
the five years were up, they behaved themselves for five years,
(18:18):
and after five years they thumb their those that the
State of Massachusetts regulators.
Speaker 4 (18:23):
I mean, just I'll tell you so. In in twenty ten,
a Cerberus paid eight hundred and ninety five million dollars
to buy the carry Task System.
Speaker 2 (18:35):
Okay, what is its value today? If any I know
it's invasorancy proceeedings, but.
Speaker 5 (18:41):
It has its value today.
Speaker 4 (18:43):
I haven't seen any really good. So nobody's looking at
the value of the whole chain right now because it's
being broken up piece by piece. And some places like
you have Norton Hospital that had Norwood Hospital that has
been closed.
Speaker 3 (19:00):
For that was hit that was hit with a flood.
Speaker 2 (19:02):
Okay, so so so I'll give them a break on
that right that was hit by a flood. But you
have these other hospitals. I don't understand how hospitals go
out of business, to be really honest with you, it
seems to me whenever I've known anyone going to a hospital,
you get you get charged for everything down to an aspirin,
(19:25):
and you know, which is understandable, but.
Speaker 3 (19:30):
Boy, what a what a mess. John.
Speaker 2 (19:31):
Let's take a break. I want to open up the
phone lines. Give folks there's a couple of folks waiting.
If not, we'll open up phone calls. You've explained this
extraordinarily well. Obviously, this is a lack of oversight and nobody,
nobody identified this problem. It's like I just came back
from Pompeii in Italy. It's it's almost as if you're
(19:56):
next to Mount Vesuvius and you say, you know, I
got a bad feeling here that this thing might erupt.
This is our own little monk Vesuvius without the lava
here in Massachusetts, because it's going to affect a lot
of people adversely. Six one seven two thirty six one
seven nine thirty. My guest is Professor John McDonough. He
(20:20):
is a professor of the Practice of healthcare at the
Harvard chan School of Public Health. He knows this situation
very well. He's explained it extraordinarily well. Uh, and we'll
take some more questions. I have plenty of questions, but
I want to open it up for you to get
an opportunity to spark to speak with Professor McDonough. Not
(20:41):
only where we go from here, how did we get here?
And is there any resolution that might that just might
provide a good solution or a livable solution here in Massachusetts.
It looks to me like this is a train work,
a train wreck in slow motion. Hopefully John McDonough will
(21:02):
be able to convince me that that characterization is incorrect
once we get back right after the news at the
bottom of the hour.
Speaker 3 (21:09):
My name is Dan Ray. This is Nightside.
Speaker 1 (21:12):
Night Side with Dan Ray on Boston's news radio.
Speaker 2 (21:18):
My guest is doctor John McDonough was with the Cham
School of Public Health at Harvard University. Doctor McDonough, I
want to go to phone calls. We've had people holding
on here, so I've got a whole bunch of questions.
But you have explained this so well. My last question
(21:38):
before we go to break, so if all of this
happened in twenty and fifteen and the oversight was withdrawn
by the regulators. Governor Baker was in charge of the
state at the time, he was running for well, he
(21:58):
was still really in his first He started in twenty fourteen.
Speaker 5 (22:02):
He started twenty fifteen.
Speaker 3 (22:04):
This was twenty fifteen, I know that, but start he.
Speaker 5 (22:06):
Got elected in fourteen until so he.
Speaker 2 (22:09):
Was he came on board as this thing was starting
to become what was lacking regulation oversight.
Speaker 3 (22:18):
Was he where what was going on?
Speaker 4 (22:22):
I have not heard him explicitly say what he knew
and what he didn't know. We know that he was
paying attention, particularly his Health and Human Service Secretary Mary
lou Sutter's was paying attention to it. There is a
desire on the part of the administration and the state
(22:44):
to not want to intervene in the affairs of a
for profits system that has lots of sources of financing
on its own, and so there's an interest in making
sure that patient care is appropriate and up the snuff.
And uh and Ralph was a good salesman. Ralph DELLATORI
(23:08):
the the CEO of the system, and did a lot
of a lot of letting, you know, put putting forward
a good story about what was happening.
Speaker 5 (23:21):
And uh and uh.
Speaker 4 (23:23):
There there were so many challenges, you know, just talk
about you know, Governor Baker and the m bt A
and all of those are just just for starters. So
so and and I'd say this is true of Governor
Heally today.
Speaker 5 (23:35):
There's not there's not.
Speaker 4 (23:36):
A desire to have to take taxpayer money in Massachusetts
and use it to prop up or rescue a for
profit system like this and so, and so you can
look back and hindsight is just a wonderful gift to have.
But you know, there was this expectation that they had
(23:59):
enough resource verses that they would be able to work
it out and sustain themselves. And that turned out to
be tragically incorrect, because I think there was a misjudgment
about doctor delator and what his game was and what
he was really about.
Speaker 2 (24:12):
Did did Governor Baker have a relationship with doctor Delatora?
I mean, governors tend to know the moves and shakers
in our society. Was there any interaction between the two
of them.
Speaker 4 (24:23):
Yeah, from the best of my knowledge, there there was
an interaction and and uh uh uh and doctor Delatoria
would talk directly to the governor, and so yeah, I
think I think there was there was a relationship. And uh,
you know, I don't know. I don't have precise information
on how deeply the state leadership engaged because they had
(24:47):
many other challenges and and didn't see that it was
their job to come in and uh, the heavy handed
monitor of a for profit system.
Speaker 3 (24:59):
All right, let's get the phone calls. Six.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
Let me go start it off with Robert Is in Quincy, Massachusetts.
Let him get to Robert. First off, Robert, you were
first up with Professor John McDonald.
Speaker 3 (25:13):
What's your comment of question?
Speaker 7 (25:16):
This is a loaded one. My first comment is, having
worked in the healthcare field, we all know about Stewart.
We know about the chairman. He has a nice, big boat.
He has profit. It's all about profit and it's too
good to be true. Charlie Baker worked as an executive
(25:37):
for haved Kilgrim. He knew all about health care. He did.
Speaker 8 (25:44):
And we want to go back one more. We have
comforts health care Potter Stewart, and they shut it down.
Seventy thousand people, patients like myself. We're out and about
without doctors. Now let's go over to Nowen Hospital. The
hospital has a flood. They stop building the hospitals. Then
all of a sudden they stop in their tracks because
(26:07):
it's going to cost them money. And the Connie's one.
I live in North Quincy. There are people in dorchesterday
desperately need that hospital.
Speaker 2 (26:16):
We know that, Robert. But what I'm trying to do is, well, Robert,
stop yelling at.
Speaker 7 (26:23):
Us, Okay, sleep for me.
Speaker 3 (26:24):
I favor take his audio down. Robert, if you want
to ask a question.
Speaker 2 (26:28):
If you want to have a conversation with Professor McDonough,
that would be great. But I didn't bring him on
here as a guest to listen to people yell at him.
So do you have a question for Professor McDonough, Go ahead.
Speaker 7 (26:41):
Robert, Professor McDonough and also a state rep. I listened
to you and Dan Wright. I have a lot of
respect for both of you. Well, what I don't have
a respect for somebody's sleeping at the wheel and what
do I mean? And this is the question. You stated
that when they came off this uh receivership or whatever
(27:04):
you want to call it, nobody did nothing. Now, shlie Baker.
Speaker 2 (27:09):
It wasn't receive It wasn't a receiver, David. Let's you've
already made that point. Let's if there's a question, great,
If not, I'm going to go to some callers.
Speaker 3 (27:18):
We have a question. Go ahead, Robert, if there's.
Speaker 8 (27:20):
John, tell me why nobody took the time and effort
to hold a finger in the damn It's all about profit?
Speaker 3 (27:31):
Okay, do you want to make your speech? Thanks very
much for you call. Robert.
Speaker 2 (27:34):
I didn't perceive a question there. You want to comment
on his his screed John, I.
Speaker 4 (27:40):
Would just say that I totally resonate and respect and
feel his anger.
Speaker 7 (27:45):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (27:46):
And he mentioned Norwood, he mentioned Compass, he mentioned Carnie.
He also could have mentioned Quincy Hospital, which which Ralph
Delatori took under Stewart's wing and then ended up closing it.
The speaker of the House, Ron Mariano, will never forgive
(28:06):
that because he feels like he was personally misled about
the situation and about what would be done, and thought
he had promises that Quincy would stay open and it
wasn't true. So I think Robert's anger, I resonate with it,
I feel it, and I feel like there are people
all over Greater Boston who have a similar feelings.
Speaker 5 (28:29):
There's a lot of betrayal that kind of doesn't come
out in the.
Speaker 4 (28:35):
Discussion about chapter eleven and bankruptcy. But I just I
want Robert to know I think his anger and his
frustration are totally justified.
Speaker 3 (28:44):
Yep, okay.
Speaker 2 (28:45):
As I said, I was doing my best to get
a question, but we didn't. We got we did get
his anger and frustration very clearly. We'll take a break.
We have a couple of lines at six, one, seven, nine, thirty,
going to go to Joe and Lynn Joe in Plymouth,
Mark and North End Over Ladies feel free to jump
on board as well. Coming back on Night's Side with
Professor John McDonald of the Harvard Chant School of Public Health.
Speaker 1 (29:06):
Right after this, Now back to Dan Ray live from
the Window World Night Side Studios. I'm WBZ News Radio.
Speaker 2 (29:15):
Okay, I'm going to look folks because of my tough
time with Robert there questions. You got a question you've
been waiting, I'll give you an opportunity.
Speaker 3 (29:23):
Let's have at it. Let me go to Joe. Joe,
you're on with professor.
Speaker 9 (29:27):
Hey, Dan, thank you very much, and this is an
excellent subject, Robert. I hope that when we're off the
air we give a number to get in contact with you.
Have a few things I'm want to say.
Speaker 2 (29:36):
You know what we don't We don't We're not doing
connections here. Joe, I have a guest. If you want
to ask a question. Have I move on to someone's
going to ask my guest a question?
Speaker 9 (29:44):
Go ahead, Joe, Yes, I did. My question is can
we put the hospitals back the way they used to be?
Because Saint Elizabeth used to be a good hospital now
I know someone that went there is having a lot
of problems with it, and other hospitals they've gone down
the tubes, and I'm disappointed in Stewart and Lynn hospitals
closed like your comments on that.
Speaker 2 (30:04):
Okay, John, is there any hope here or is hope
you know slim and none and Slim is just left town.
Speaker 4 (30:10):
I think it is possible, It is possible that we
can come out of this, and not for every institution,
but for most of them in a better situation than
we were in under Stuart. There are, in fact, and
it's not it's not public, and so I can't I
can't say who's gonna do it, but there are for
(30:34):
at least about five or six of the institutions, there
are Massachusetts based nonprofit and community based hospitals that are
looking to acquire one or the other of the Stuart hospitals.
Speaker 5 (30:54):
And so that is a that if.
Speaker 4 (30:57):
That plays out the way that people are saying beneath
the surface, that could be a real positive, and we could.
Speaker 5 (31:05):
We wouldn't.
Speaker 4 (31:06):
We won't go back to a carry toss Christy chain.
That's just not going to happen. There's no one in
a position to do that, but some of our our
real solid community based institutions are we understand stepping forward
and have made bids and we think that that's the
direction that a lot of this is going to go,
So we could end up in a better place.
Speaker 2 (31:26):
So potentially without telling us who might be involved, are
we talking about something that might resolve itself within a
month or within a year?
Speaker 4 (31:37):
This is short term? Yeah, no, this this this would
be this would be settled relatively quickly, and the state
will be playing an important supportive role in providing some
advanced financing to help make these deals and arrangements move forward.
So yeah, and regarding Lynn Hospital, I still believe it
(31:58):
was a real.
Speaker 5 (31:59):
Tragedy that Lynn lost.
Speaker 4 (32:00):
It's only the hut Care Hospital and yeah, that's but
understand what's been going on since the early.
Speaker 5 (32:08):
Nineteen nineties Massachusetts.
Speaker 4 (32:11):
And this is back when I was in the legislature
and I opposed it, but Massachusetts made a decision to
say we are done with state regulation in terms of
trying to determine the fate of the hospital system in Massachusetts.
We think that the market is a better way to
do it. And so we've really had about thirty years
(32:31):
of having the market much more involved in the fate
of our hospitals rather than community planning and really trying
to understand the need and have government play a proactive role.
In the nineties, we sort of had this idea, Oh,
government always messes it up. We can't rely on government,
and I think we're paying the price for that politics
(32:55):
policy decision more than thirty years ago.
Speaker 2 (32:58):
Now, all right, Joe, good question, Joe. I got others
that want to get to Okay, appreciate it.
Speaker 3 (33:04):
Question. Good night, market, north end of the market. You
got to be quick for me. Go right ahead.
Speaker 6 (33:09):
You're all with Dan doctor. Thank you, Dan doctor, thank
you for the time. Uh, the long story short. I
know servers well, I know truere quite well. They're a client.
I ran the technology for them. The question is where
does the tough love come from here? Everybody expects that
when they call nine one one, they're going to the
(33:31):
best in care. That's not that's no longer possible. Where
does the tough love come from here?
Speaker 4 (33:40):
The immediate tough love is that is that every acute
care hospital operates under a license issued by the Massachusetts
Department of Public Health, and so when something goes awry,
when something goes wrong.
Speaker 2 (33:56):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (33:57):
The first place is what is the Department of Public
Health understand and what are they doing? They are kind
of the boots on the ground, the first people in there,
and in fact, throughout this whole crisis, since it emerged
about six months ago at the start of the year
of the Department of Public Health has in fact had
(34:17):
monitors and observers in every one of these steward facilities
just to make sure that the quality of care is
at the level that people have a right to expect
it to be so.
Speaker 5 (34:30):
But there are higher levels as well.
Speaker 4 (34:32):
There's something called the Massachusetts Policy Commission, which has some
really terrific people that do financial analysis and understanding. So yeah,
there are a lot of different players involved in this,
but Department of Public Health is the go to entity
in terms of immediate reaction and oversight.
Speaker 2 (34:53):
Mark, great question. I appreciate it very much. Thank you,
Thank you, sir. Let me go next to Uh. I'm
going to go to John in debthim. John, you got
to be quick, but getting tight on time with Professor
John McDonald.
Speaker 10 (35:05):
Go ahead, John, Okay, I'll be very quick. I'm a
little biased. I was born I said, Elizabeth. My mother
worked there for twenty five years. But my question is
you mentioned that they the Stewart sold the real estate
after they purchased the hospital chain. Is that accurate?
Speaker 3 (35:18):
Yes?
Speaker 10 (35:18):
And then when they did that, who profited from that individually?
And can anybody be held criminally responsible for this whole thing?
And I'll listen to you, gentlemen, thank you.
Speaker 3 (35:27):
Okay, well, good question, go ahead.
Speaker 4 (35:29):
Yeah, it's a great it's a great question. I'll just
tell you that what they did. So in twenty sixteen,
Cerberus and Steward sold all the real estate to this
reach real estate investment trust called Medical Properties Trust down
in Atlanta, and they took the money. A lot of
(35:50):
it went straight into Cerberus's pocket, about five hundred million
uh and some of it Ralph Tellatory, the president of
the CEO of Stewart, used it to go on a
buying spree of other hospitals around the country with the
money from the real estate, so that by the year
(36:11):
twenty twenty before everything crashed, Steward was the largest for
profit hospital chain in the entire country. Out of nothing
very quickly. So basically they took the money and they
went on a buying spree. And now it's all crashing
all around them.
Speaker 2 (36:29):
Now in twenty twenty, it seems to me that there
would have been a lot of people going to hospitals
for COVID related problems, and that that would have made
hospitals more valuable. And how hospitals run out of money
or put themselves out of business is beyond me. I
have never gone to a hospital, looked at a bill
and said, Wow, they only charged me so much.
Speaker 3 (36:51):
What's going on?
Speaker 2 (36:52):
John?
Speaker 4 (36:53):
So the big money for her hospital for acute care
hospitals and surgeries, and in the COVID crisis, they had
to suspend a lot of their surgeries. So the only
reason most of them didn't go bankrupt during COVID was
because the federal government came in and just smothered them
(37:15):
in federal cash to tie them over during this period
where they couldn't do it. And then they came out
of that and they came back into relatively healthy shape
where they are for the most part now.
Speaker 5 (37:28):
But COVID was not a.
Speaker 4 (37:31):
Financial boon for the institutions at all.
Speaker 2 (37:34):
I'm going to try to steal one more minute. Rob
and Dan and I want to become in a Bob
in Brockton. Bob you late. I got only a minute
for you. What can you do.
Speaker 11 (37:44):
I'll make it quick. I'll make you quick. The question
to John is it looks like this is a profit
type thing. Where is it leave the County Hospital? The
County Hospital really serves in between bars. It's been in
social hospital. We really can't afford to close its matter
of fact, my doctor is a specialist in gastrology. Because
(38:09):
the hospital is closing. Yep, he's retiring.
Speaker 2 (38:12):
Okay, we got it, Bob, Bob, we got the question.
I think you're not going to be happy with the answer.
The Connie Hospital is due to close the end of
this month. Am I correct on that?
Speaker 3 (38:20):
John?
Speaker 4 (38:21):
That is correct, And I think there's a lot of
people who are very angry and upset about that. It's
a tough judgment called by the Heally administration. I think
they need to do a better job coming out and
explaining everything that went into that decision.
Speaker 2 (38:35):
Bob, not the answer you wanted, but it's a straight answer.
Thank you, my friend, Thank you, John McDonough, Thank you
for your time tonight. A great explanation. Whether people like
the answers or not, that's the reality.
Speaker 3 (38:50):
John. Love to have you back. Let's keep in touch.
Speaker 4 (38:52):
Okay, great to be with you, Dan, thanks for keeping
me on. It's great to connect with you.
Speaker 3 (38:57):
My pleasure, my pleasure. Thank you very much.
Speaker 2 (39:00):
When we get back, if you want to keep talking
about this light, the lines up. If not, we're going
to talk about bike lanes in Boston. Coming back on
Night Side right after the ten
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