February 20, 2025 • 33 mins
This month, the Cook Islands signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China, sparking tensions between the islands and New Zealand.
It has sparked renewed discussions about China's interest in the Pacific, and how New Zealand should respond, as the Asia-Pacific region remains a hotbed of diplomatic tension between the East and West.
Marco de Jong, a Pacific historian and lecturer at AUT, who has been doing a lot of research into AUKUS, joins Thomas this week to discuss what's happening in the region.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:06):
Hello and welcome to on the titles the New Zealand
Heralds Politics Podcast. I'm your host, Deputy Political editor of
the New Zealand Herald Thomas Coughlin. With me today to
discuss a range of the political developments and policy in
the Pacific is Marco Dijong. He's a lecturer at a
ut up in Auckland, but he's down for the Pacific
(00:27):
Islands Political Studies Association conference which has been held over
the last couple of days. I'm in Wellington, very big
conference which which which Winston Peter's addressed to open with
quite a significant sort of foreign policy speech which you
can you can read about on the website, but we're
we're not going to talk about that. We're going to
talk about Ucust primarily, I guess. So Marco, thank you
very much for joining us.
Speaker 2 (00:47):
Giorder Thomas man a lover, thanks for having me.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
You've written extensively about August. You're probably doing some of
the most I guess journalism on August. You're you're you're
oaing the Department's extensively to have built up a paper
trail about the York Agreement. I suppose one of the
things that you have exposed is the fact that it's
fairly established that it is quite a significant foreign policy
development for this country. But one of the things that
(01:12):
that has wound its way through your work is the
fact that the government has been disinclaimed to lead that conversation,
I guess, and that a lot of the of working
out what this means for this country and as being
happened as happening behind closed doorism and not necessarily within
view of the public who probably do have a strong
view on it.
Speaker 2 (01:31):
Yeah, I suppose there's been a lack of transparency of
around the assumptions that are guiding our engagement with UCUS
and some of the trade offs that it involves. I
have kind of framed it as a generational foreign policy
decision for the way that it affects who our friends are,
who we trade with, who are you know, how our
military's arranged, where our intelligence goes, and our relationships in
(01:54):
the region and closer to home in the Pacific. So
I've sought to contribute via a disciplinary way, you know,
through our Official Information Act, you know, one of our
best tools for democratic oversight over foreign policy making. So yeah,
it's it's been a privilege really to contribute.
Speaker 1 (02:13):
Can we just dig down with that? So when you
say who our friends, where our intelligence goes? I suppose
at the moment the Aucust partners are Five Eyes partners
minus Canada, who might become a pelatary partner themselves. America
is an interesting kind of a friend, but some people
would say it's a friend Australia traditionally is you know,
it's our awny formal ally. So so how does it
(02:36):
how do you think, given the relationships as they stand now,
how do you think it changes those relationships with those
countries or is it more what Aucust say is about
our relationship to other countries who aren't five guys who
I'm you know, our formal alli Australia.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
Certainly, the way that Aucust was announced in September of
twenty twenty one, you know, via the media, surprised both
the French, who had set to conclude a submarine deal
with the Australians, and to the Pacific, who you know,
under things like the Piccatala Declaration on Regional Security, are
obliged to consult on matters of regional security. It kind
of took everyone by surprise, and so you know, ORCUS
(03:14):
is seen as you said squarely, as like a five
eyes thing. It's seen as elevating Australia's position within the
five Eyes, potentially above Canada. It's an expanded security pact
between allies, and it involves the transfer of nuclear submarines,
which is you know, obviously the Pinnacle technology. So it's
a very tight alliance between the anglosphere, and it's been
(03:34):
framed as being directed at China as part of a
broader indo Pacific strategy that seeks to contain China by
extending nuclear deterrence into the north of Australia, developing new
types of advanced warfighting technologies, and linking the industrial military
industrial basis of its meminations. So you know, understanding how
(03:56):
New Zealand might fit into that picture has been a
bit of the work of this and what it means
for other relationships, say with the Pacific or with our
with China. For example.
Speaker 1 (04:06):
Now you mentioned the BacT our declaration. Are that Please
correct me because I'm going on scripture that that declaration
affirms the importance of Pacific solutions for Pacific problems and
consulting with Pacific nations on on on Pacific issues rather
than bringing in an outside solution. The primary is that.
Speaker 2 (04:31):
For me, itar is part of a you know, Pacific
regional security approach which prioritizes through things like boy bi
Qatara or the twenty fiftieth strategy for a Blue Pacific
Continent that solutions to Pacific climate. Pacific security needs, which
are things like nuclear disarment, climate action, human development should
come first and foremost from within the region. AUCUST was
(04:52):
seen as its reliance on nuclear technologies, its military focus.
It's the fact that it's pointed at a very squarely
at one nation and therefore goes against the kind of
regional ethos as friends to all, enemies to none. You know,
it seemed to be kind of incompatible both with you know,
the kind of tenor of Pacific diplomacy, but also you know,
(05:13):
the kind of broader framing of the notion of a
blue Pacific continent versus the end of Pacific strategy. So yeah,
that contradiction places New Zealand awkwardly in the middle.
Speaker 1 (05:23):
And I suppose we saw the declarations sited I think
during the Solomon Islands crisis a few years ago regarding
the Elked Chinese Security Pact. The view of Australia. I
think New Zealand as well, was perhaps that that in
that particular moment there was a sense that the Solomon
Islands were reaching outside of the region before looking to
(05:45):
within the region. And I suppose there's a sense there
might be a sense I'd be very interested to know
what you think of this. There might be a sense
that particularly Australia or maybe New Zealand with August wants
to have it both ways. The ethos of searching from
within for Pacific solutions to security and climate needs is
used to keep China out of the region in situations
like the on of the Islands. It doesn't seem to
(06:07):
be enforced in the same way against Australia and New Zealand,
who who look for security outside of the region themselves.
Is that there is there a hypocrisy there or is.
Speaker 2 (06:17):
New Zealand's regional security policy long standing is one of
strategic denial and so the family first model of regional
security through Pacific regionalism itself is part of that strategy. So, yes,
there is a double standard in so far as New Zealand,
you know, historically through anzas or Australia continues that that
(06:39):
they do play it both ways between the Western Alliance
and their their regional partners in PIFF and Asian You know,
so that is that is.
Speaker 1 (06:47):
What do you make of the Chinese strikeforce currently wanting
its way down the east coast of Australia. Look, they
haven't said the sun this yet, but I imagine and
in future debates around orchest Australia will say, well, look,
this is an example of China projecting its showing that
it has the ability to project power in the region,
and things like Aucust will be necessary. I mean, the
sub the pure submarine component of August Pilla one will
(07:09):
be necessary to ensure that that Australia can project back
or maintain I suppose a forward projection themselves.
Speaker 2 (07:16):
I mean, that's the core debate at the heart of
August Pillar one discussions in Australia is the extent to
which their force posture, Well, the defense capability should be
linked with their force posture and foreign policy generally. So,
for example, if Australia seeks to be a middle power
seeking security in Asia, is a nuclear submarine capability that
(07:37):
is designed to you know, project forward into Go one
straight and appropriate capability. Similarly, you know, there are those
within Australia, you know, x people, intelligence community, former foreign ministers,
former defense chiefs that believe that Australia's force posture should
be focused on the defense of continents of Australia. So
(07:59):
you know that group of Chinese warships that are making
its way to the Tasman the nuclear submarine capability that
they're describing, you know, it's there's a question about whether
it could actually operate in and around continents Australia versus
say much more of the types of the diesel electric
submarines and so on and so forth. So yeah, there's
(08:20):
a question about, Yeah, the appropriateness of ORCUS, and I
think that raises questions for New Zealand two. And it's
consideration of Pillar two. If we think about this tension
between New Zealand having a balance forced or operating in
the realm kind of with this humanitarian assistance and disaster
response focus, maritime security focus, whether or not the kind
(08:42):
of high tech war fighting capabilities that are all about
remote targeting or hyposonic missiles drones, and whether or not
we should be expeditionary in our force, and how much
interoperability we should have with US forward power prediction. I
think these are questions that need to be asked about
our considered of Aucust. Is it fit for purpose in
(09:02):
what we need to do? Is it helping us to
do best? And I think if one is serious about
genuine regional security, or one is seeking to contribute to
the deterring or denying of China, is it best to
do so militarily or through August? Because I don't think
that that case has necessarily been made out. And then
the other thing is about those types of technologies, what
(09:25):
technologies could we get bilaterally or through five Eyes. So
I think that there are certain assumptions within that, you know,
that kind of point towards August, but they haven't really
been questioned.
Speaker 1 (09:34):
Right, so just to look into that a wee bit so.
And I think Labor might have made this argument itself
in New Zealand, that New Zealand already has a significant
sort of relationship with those countries five five eyes, and
if there is a sort of a case for technology
sharing and interoperability, perhaps that could be made through the
either for five eyes intelligence sharing or call what the
(09:54):
five country There are I think thirty five country agreements
that exist between those those five countries, and it might
be better to explore that rather than via do you
think and in terms of the other point you raised
there that the Chinese deterrence or deterring China in the
Pacific militarily or via other means, what sort of other
(10:15):
means do you think would be I mean at the
disposal of Australia and New Zealand.
Speaker 2 (10:21):
Well, I think that there's diplomacy and development. I think
if we look at our long term regional security policy,
it's been about frustrating opportunities for outside powers to gain
a regional foothold. And I think this kind of moved
towards deterrence, military deterrence through defense capability and this new
assertive posture we see with when Saint Peter's in the region.
And we can talk about Kidibus and Cook Islands later,
(10:44):
but I think that that kind of shift and then
the denial of saying indigenous led foreign policy and things
like that, you know, it's a question of is this
actually working to counter China in the region, Because I
think asked Mark Brown it didn't deter him at all.
I think we should be realistic about our capability and
I think That's another thing that those that are skeptical
(11:05):
of aucust in Australia raised. It's like, you know, you
can spend three hundred and sixty eight billion Australian dollars
for you know, up to eight nuclear submarines in thirty
years time. People are talking about twenty twenty seven. You know,
what is what use is one thing. It's the same
as New Zealand. We can spend a lot of money
on expensive military capabilities, or we can do probably what
(11:27):
we're better at, which is soft power. And I think
that soft power also gives us flexibility. We're seeing the
US become increasingly riven by domestic political instability. They're still
involved in disastrous misadventure overseas, and I think that question
of them withdrawing, you know, but still being very intervenious,
you know, this kind of question about Trump. You know,
(11:48):
I think New Zealand is more flexible, It's more able
to work north and south and east to west with
this kind of more independent, regionally centered foreign policy. And
I think that historically that's ironically not only the basis
of independent foreign policy, but it's a strategic contribution to
the Western Alliance at the time because we've been able
to do things that the are larger, less flexible powers can't,
(12:10):
you know. And so it's yeah, in.
Speaker 1 (12:12):
The speech when some Peter's made on Wednesday night, the
message on AID, which in case is a significant part
of this is more with less development assistance. And that
comes at a time when I mean, it's unclear what
is happening with the US AID and the Pacific, but
one would have to think it's probably not good for
you or expecting the current level of contribution to stay
where it is. I think the Lower Institute has about
(12:34):
three billion dollars of US AID over the last or
ten years in the US dollars being spent in the Pacific.
And if you know, if if if US aid, if
the US is sort of putting the screws that on
that spending and New Zealand is looking at spending less,
I mean, that does open up an opportunity for another power,
perhaps China, to fill the breach.
Speaker 2 (12:55):
Certainly it won't help, although I would note that you know,
it's probably more new wants in that in terms of
if the US pull out, Pacific nations are not just
going to go to China. You know, they have a
long experience of managing geostrategic competition, and they will be
concerned by what it means for regional institutions US say
(13:17):
dropping out. But you see with Vanuatu historically, you know,
a member of the non line of movement, committed to
decolonization regionally some of the most creative things like the
Fossil Fuel Non Proliferation Treaty. You know that the new
Prime Minister Napa has said, we want to work with
the US. So they're they're canny, like Pacific nations are
clever and they have agency and so yeah, I don't
(13:41):
think it's it's just a case of zero sum. I think.
I think. And it's also you know, when we talk
about this geo strategic competition, it's not just China in
the US, It's a whole host of other It's really
congested regional space is the EU, there's and there's other
players that are in there you know, less frequently and
they pull out and whatever. But yeah, it's it's an
(14:04):
interesting time to study Pacific geopolitics.
Speaker 1 (14:07):
How do you feel about obviously this is a French
domestic issue as well, the ongoing involvement in France and
the Pacific and via the flare up in New Caledonia
last last year. Writers have made the point that but
potentially one of one of France's desires to stay involved
in the region is itself basing and Pacific countries and
(14:29):
the ability to project power again in the Pacific. That
too suggests like US, China and France itself a Middle
European power. Certainly, France frames itself as a middle global
Indo Pacific power, and New Caledonia and French Polynesia or
are a vital part of that. I think that we
should be realistic though New Caledonia is our closest geographic
(14:50):
neighbor and an anachronistic French colonialism are powered by force
in the deployment of six thousand gendarmes and their undemocratic
electoral reforms are sewing instability in our region. And so
this talk of oh what would a New Caledonia, an
independent New Caledonia mean, and would this be you know,
put would they be pushed into China? But you know,
(15:12):
an indigenous population has been denied the right to self determination. Yeah,
it's an analienable right. New Zealanders stresses its defense cooperation
with the French armed forces in New Caledonia. But we
need to be clear. This is this is Western self
injury that's caused us. You know, there's been tens of
thousands of people that have lost their jobs, billions of dollars.
Is an economic and social crisis. They're under curfew for
(15:34):
six like six months, you know, and New Zealand just
evacuated our people. And what's the situation there now? It's
it's it's it's really concerning what should New Zealand do
in this In this regard, it's a stranger game situation,
I guess, and perhaps you can enlighten me as to
the sort of international legal situation, a game for the
(15:56):
back at our idea of Pacific regionalism that it seems
sort of counter to that a domestic situation and a
Pacific country in New Caledonia is being treated as a
kind of a very sort of early tweenth century, nineteenth
century kind of case of, to put it down charitably,
(16:17):
a crisis of imperialism almost where where it's a flear
up on the periphery that needs the metropolit to kind
of reach out and to make it down, to put
it very crudely, that too seems just a challenge to
everything we think about or all of the received wisdom
of how we have structured the way that Pacific politics
and regionalism should work.
Speaker 2 (16:37):
Certainly there's a role for the region to play. I mean,
it's considered to be an internal manner for France, but
New Caledonia is a full member of the Pacific Calan's Forum,
and so you know, the sending of a Troika observation
mission at the end of last year, you know, it
was a way for to seek, you know, an independent view,
ask about you know, what the political future is for
(16:58):
New Caledonia and its relationship and eventual integration with the region.
Should note that, you know, New Zealand was part of
these discussions right through the seventies and into the eighties.
When U Caleedoni was reinscribed on the twenty of twenty
four for declonization. At the time, diplomats did state that
they thought that declonization of New Caledoni would be inevitable.
(17:19):
We seem to have stepped away from that because of convenience,
because of broader geopolitical imperatives. But the people that suffer sufferer,
indigenous people on the ground.
Speaker 1 (17:28):
We're just going to take a quick break and then
come back to talking about the Cook Islands, political dilima
of the last couple of weeks and the comprehensive strategic
partnership that Mike Mark has signed with China. Hello, and
(17:54):
welcome back to On the Titles. I'm here with lecturer
Marco Young, who is discussing a range of specific political
policy on the On the Titles podcast. So Marca, can
we just can we talk about the Cook Islands now?
Obviously everyone's been watching the situation of the last couple
of weeks Worth New Zealand and Winston Peters in particular
(18:14):
getting pretty frustrated about the level of consultation that Wellington
received over the confrehensive strategic partnership that the Prime Minister
Mark Brown was looking to sign with China and then
did sign and other agreements. Mark Brown says, yes, look,
I think it's the two thousand and one partnership. The
declaration does stipulate the consultation, but the consultation that he
(18:37):
gave was not to see the agreements. The declaration doesn't
stipulate the level of consultation, so he believes he lived
up to the agreement himself. What's what's your sort of
take on what's.
Speaker 2 (18:46):
Going on here?
Speaker 1 (18:46):
Is it a the two thousand and one declaration no
longer fit for purpose? In certainly seems to be what
Winston Peters was saying on Wednesday. Or is this just
a case of a wrinkle in a usually fairly strong relationship.
Speaker 2 (18:59):
What's I think it's being framed as a situation where
Cook Islands wants its cake. I eat the New Zealand
passport and eat it too. I know, act as a
full independent sovereign state. And there's a suggestion that like
it's desired international personality and its financial entanglements through things
like the shipping register or and as out of step
(19:25):
with its constitutional reality. What I have felt has been
missing from the discussion is an honest accounting of what
New Zealand stands, you know, gains from the realm status
of the Cook Islands that you know it's it gives
us a status that we wouldn't otherwise have as a
small power. It gives us a friend or a proxy
(19:49):
in international negotiations of which Cook Islands is a part.
When the self government and free association relationship was formalized
in nineteen sixty five, you know, New Zealand was able
to dispensive its col new obligations, and it did so
because it had stewarded through decolonization as ah in nineteen
sixty two, and that has been the basis that support
(20:11):
for Pacific decolonization and its acceptance with African states has
been part of our you know, liberal international image, and
it's given us credibility on the global stage is a
good faith multilateral actor, and that's part of the reasons
say we've got to sit on the security count one
twenty seventeen. So I think, you know, that special relationship
(20:33):
and the way that it was negotiated, I think that,
you know, that's kind of missing from an honest accounting.
New Zealand's scene is benevolent and it's been frustrated by
these little partners that won't play games. You know that.
What I really despise about how this has transpired is
that New Zealand has kind of held the passport over
the Cook Islands people, and it's made reference frequently to
(20:54):
the Cook Islands people, implying that there's an undemocratic thing
that's happening. Well, there's a gap between you know, the
elites that interested in deep sea mining and signing these
clandestine dealers with China versus the people, and it's created
domestic political unrest is a big protest. And but we
should ask who the who the audience for this political
theater is. And there's a suggestion that it's actually five
(21:15):
Vised Nations that New Zealand is trying to with as
part of this kind of new assertive posture. It's trying
to show that we're not going to lose our you know,
these outposts to China. And I think that that you know,
the stakes are not probably not as high as they
as they're made out to be, right, and so I
think that that's it's not really honest.
Speaker 1 (21:37):
Certainly, if New Zealand is trying to deepen its relationship
with Five Eyes and and and show its value to
the Vvised Nations, well, the value isn't The value isn't
the zero points even to one point two percent of
GDP that we spend on defense, which is depending on
how you measure it, it's very low defense spending both
normally because GDP isn't very large, and as a percentage
(21:58):
of GDP we have, yeah, a very one I think,
very little value to those to those countries of anything.
But I suppose one of the things that New Zealand
does bring us a large exclusive economic zone and territorial projection,
which is precisely what the cooks deliver.
Speaker 2 (22:15):
We should be asking, you know, what is New Zealand's
geostrategic value in this new rivalry. And the suggestion is,
as you say, it's not probably not defense bend, but
we're a flag you know, in a coalition of the willing.
We have a unique geography for things like space launchers.
We have a large exclusive economic zone, some of which
(22:36):
has polymetallic nodules, critical mineral supply chains. You know, these
are the types of questions that are being asked of
New Zealand when we consider things like orcusts or the
way this is all playing out. You know, Minister Collins
has been explicit that this is part of part of
this question is what does New Zealand bring to the table.
My question is, you know, is this in our national interest?
(22:57):
And how is our national interest being constructed? I would
say that thirty percent of our population are Maloro Pacific.
We are in and of the Pacific. We have a
non discretionary interest in Pacific security that is not shared
by larger outside powers. We're linked by our geography, demography,
our genealogy in a way that means that what happens
(23:18):
in the region matters deeply to us. And with things
like climate, climate breakdown, increasing disaster, wealth inequality, political instability,
space launchers to contribute to satellite warfare, are buying one
frigate to be part of a carrier strike group that's
going to find in Taiwan. Actually what we need actually
how we see our role in the region. Is it
(23:39):
a powerful version, version or vision for New Zealand. You know,
I think that the world has changed, and I think
that actually the geostrategic calculus has changed in a way
that probably means that it's not just about them getting
a base in the Cook Islands. It's more about all
kinds of other stuff.
Speaker 1 (23:57):
Isn't the defensive Taiwan You could you could put a
specific leans on that it's a small independent Well, it's
a large island and the question of independence is a
vexed one, but it is a self governing ireland threatened
by a large regional power. President that a large a
large regional power can just do what it likes to
(24:18):
a neighbor, you know, accepting all of our history the president,
there would be a worrying one for small island states
like New Zealand by the Pacific, and therefore one would
think that there is an argument to line up on
the defense on the side of the defense of Taiwan
against China, if that, if that were to the conflict,
where do you transpire? And hopefully it won't, But but
(24:39):
you know that that is the argument. I suppose that
that that you might make what you to make.
Speaker 2 (24:43):
That I'm so concerned about what's happening in Ukraine where
two superpowers are seen to be outside just carving up,
you know, and that seems to be in violation of
international law, the multilateral system, you know. And I think
we should stand on New Zealand's principles. Certainly, I think
that the Pacific have its own relationships, and it's a
(25:06):
long standing debate about nations lining up on China's side
taiwan side. Yeah, But I think for New Zealand, I'm
struck by the example in nineteen seventy five Full of Saigon,
the US withdraw from the region. We're seen to withdraw
from the region in nineteen seventy eight under the muld
Doing government. Dennis McLain rights a foreign policy for the
(25:29):
first time, centering New Zealand's defense on the Pacific, and
it talks about coast of defense, Ireland defense, you know,
as opposed to forward defense against communism in Asia, and
a part of it is a budgetry thing. The all
shocks have been it's like a difficult time. So I think,
(25:50):
you know, there's a case as these things move around,
like the Ukraine thing, you could line up on one side,
but then the whole rugg is pulled underneath you. I think,
you know, increased self reliance or collective security in your
immediate region, things that will not change, rather than reliance
on the whims of superpowers, is a more flexible and
grounded strategy.
Speaker 1 (26:10):
Right, But the Prince, I suppose the principle of your
territorial integrity, the principle of a rules based order, meaning
that regional powers cannot just absorb or muck around there
the smaller neighbors. Again, obviously the complex there is a
complexity around just what Taiwan is. With that, I mean
there are suppose there are two ways of looking at
the Taiwan issue, which is a West versus the kind
(26:33):
of very black and white kind of Cold War framing.
And then there's a there is a principle about the
extent to which a large regional power is allowed to
dictate terms to its smaller neighbors. And I suppose the
second that second way of looking at that issue as
as slightly more sale against for small countries like New Zealand,
which you know, I suppose traditionally we have lined up
on the west side of the West versus East thing,
(26:54):
but in the last thirty years have reassessed that. But
we've never I guessed, we have really from the idea
that that larger countries should not be able to boss
around small.
Speaker 2 (27:03):
Or on one thing I've been really excited to hear
about this week at PIPSA has been this discussion of
the Zone of Peace, and part of that has been
lined up around things like territorial integrity and you know,
what a rules based order for the Pacific, you know,
for the Pacific would look like, or what you know,
how and how the region might come together and insulate
itself from the worst excesses of geopolitical rivalry. And there's
(27:26):
discussion of things like, you know, what would a Pacific
peace look like? How would you define it? There are
civil society groups that comment and you know, there should
be no peace without justice things, no peace without decolonization,
no peace without gender equity, without nuclear justice without climate action.
There are others that think that this is an opportunity
to you know, rationalize the regional security architecture and bring
(27:46):
things like that the Australian lead initiatives like the Policing
Initiative or the Pacific Response Group under the South Pacific
Defense min It's meaning bring it under the of the
Pacific Ards Forum. And I think that that's kind of
like that discussion is about what you talk. It's about,
you know, how does a region come together and try
and you know, come up with a set of rules
even and as the great powers are now doing as
(28:09):
what great powers do in the US, I mean, part
of the Ukraine thing seems to be a new Monroe
doctrine because the the you know, Trump is talking about
taking Greenland, Panama, Canada, you know, and it seems like
if that's the case, that's a you know, a regional
power seeking to absorb it absorbits, you know, and it's
the same and so if that's the case, and if
that's the agreement, then maybe we see the US step
(28:33):
back from its its current posture in Asia, and that
would be a very different conversation about Taiwan. And who knows,
it could change very quickly. I mean it certainly changed
very quickly in the case of Ukraine, and it would
be very uncomfortable for Australia and New Zealand, especially Australia
which currently is you know, you know, hosting nuclear extended
deterrence through the B fifty two's that are rotating through
(28:56):
from Guam into the Northern Territory or you know, set
to like nuclear cable submarines, so it's really you know,
they could be left out on them.
Speaker 1 (29:06):
The final question a bit of a curveball. I'm afraid
you mentioned the nodules, the mineral nodules, the undersea stuff.
Is there any sense that I saw in the strategic
partnership document released by the Cook Islands that China was
hoping to assist with some of the deep sea mining
Cooks have been keen to look at deep sea mining. Obviously,
(29:26):
there's a sort of an economic challenge that the Cooks
are facing, being no longer i think a developing country
and therefore not liable to receive the same development and
assistance that they might have done in the past, as
they are relatively higher income country, not great and looking
to sort of to diversify the local economy. Is there
(29:49):
a sense that the Americans are getting a weaver at
frost or that the Americans with themselves perhaps like to
get their hands on some of that deep sea resource,
so that it seems like there is a global battle.
And then it speaks to your remarks about Greenland before.
It seems like there is a global battle between these
shoe superbowers to consolidate supply chains right down to the
(30:09):
raw mineral harvesting in their own interest. Are you aware
of any aspects of that regarding the sort of spat
over the Cook Islands.
Speaker 2 (30:16):
The Cook Islands has sought assistance with the exploration in
their exclusive economic zone, and obviously there's this difference between
the harvesting potentially and the clarion clippet and is a
kind of thing, and then the domestic exploration in the
Cooks and then this question about how that works with
the region deeply remains of very divisive issue. You know,
Nauru Cook Islands at various times popping in any town,
(30:38):
get a bus. You know, maybe divergent positions about this
and others care for a regional moratorium. New Zealand has
been in support of regional moratorium, although with Shane Jones
and the baby big thing, you know, there's a question
about New Zealand's support for things like that or even
it's climate ongoing climate commitment. So it's part of this
broader picture about how there's the kind of under the
(31:01):
new coalition government with the contradictions between the way New
Zealand likes to act in the region and it's kind
of domestic populism or nationalism. And we saw this big
spatter its Sprifmo and Shane Jones and fishing this last
week and it's an interesting one. I think the geopolitical
calculus is there and so far as you know, from
(31:22):
what I know, I'm not sure that there's been an
economic case for so I think the geopolitical thing comes
into substance what is otherwise potentially not you know, it's
self sustaining industry, So yeah, that certainly comes into it.
It's also linked with orcus I think. You know, if
you look at this and people testifying in Congress, there's
(31:42):
footage of them talking about the links between all of
those types of things and the industrial based integration. Yeah.
So it's it's certainly big power plays and we're small
islands drifting on really you know, dangerous waters.
Speaker 1 (31:56):
I think so the the orchest implication of the deep
sea mining is is that is the Americans are thinking, well,
we need to continue to cement to soeuves and established
relationships in the region because it has an important supply
chain implication for us. Or are the minerals the minerals
aren't used for the submarines.
Speaker 2 (32:15):
No, no, yeah, it's Australia obviously as a vast mineral
wealth too. And yes, you know, it's also interesting New
Caledonia and the French or even though most of the
nickel from New Caledonia goes to China, it's what is
a strategic mineral to this question of like what the
French that can appropriate from the domestic you know, it's
all of these questions. I think back to the law
of the See negotiations and this distinction between for common humanity.
(32:39):
And then it's kind of the large maritime powers. We're
kind of seeing that player now and I'm concerned New
Zealand is stepping back from its role as kind of
like a champion for the multilateral solutions and finding common interest,
especially in the region. But that's one of the region.
That's one of the issues that divide us in the region.
Speaker 1 (32:55):
We've gone all day. Thank you very much. That was
very that was very interesting, very greatfully for you making
time in the conference program to come and talk to us.
That was on the task for another week. We're on
iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcast. We're going to
have a local edition next week where Georgina Campbell is
going to discuss local politics, and then we'll be we'll
be back the week after that. So thank you very
(33:17):
much for listening and come back
Hello and welcome to on the titles the New Zealand
Heralds Politics Podcast. I'm your host, Deputy Political editor of
the New Zealand Herald Thomas Coughlin. With me today to
discuss a range of the political developments and policy in
the Pacific is Marco Dijong. He's a lecturer at a
ut up in Auckland, but he's down for the Pacific
(00:27):
Islands Political Studies Association conference which has been held over
the last couple of days. I'm in Wellington, very big
conference which which which Winston Peter's addressed to open with
quite a significant sort of foreign policy speech which you
can you can read about on the website, but we're
we're not going to talk about that. We're going to
talk about Ucust primarily, I guess. So Marco, thank you
very much for joining us.
Speaker 2 (00:47):
Giorder Thomas man a lover, thanks for having me.
Speaker 1 (00:49):
You've written extensively about August. You're probably doing some of
the most I guess journalism on August. You're you're you're
oaing the Department's extensively to have built up a paper
trail about the York Agreement. I suppose one of the
things that you have exposed is the fact that it's
fairly established that it is quite a significant foreign policy
development for this country. But one of the things that
(01:12):
that has wound its way through your work is the
fact that the government has been disinclaimed to lead that conversation,
I guess, and that a lot of the of working
out what this means for this country and as being
happened as happening behind closed doorism and not necessarily within
view of the public who probably do have a strong
view on it.
Speaker 2 (01:31):
Yeah, I suppose there's been a lack of transparency of
around the assumptions that are guiding our engagement with UCUS
and some of the trade offs that it involves. I
have kind of framed it as a generational foreign policy
decision for the way that it affects who our friends are,
who we trade with, who are you know, how our
military's arranged, where our intelligence goes, and our relationships in
(01:54):
the region and closer to home in the Pacific. So
I've sought to contribute via a disciplinary way, you know,
through our Official Information Act, you know, one of our
best tools for democratic oversight over foreign policy making. So yeah,
it's it's been a privilege really to contribute.
Speaker 1 (02:13):
Can we just dig down with that? So when you
say who our friends, where our intelligence goes? I suppose
at the moment the Aucust partners are Five Eyes partners
minus Canada, who might become a pelatary partner themselves. America
is an interesting kind of a friend, but some people
would say it's a friend Australia traditionally is you know,
it's our awny formal ally. So so how does it
(02:36):
how do you think, given the relationships as they stand now,
how do you think it changes those relationships with those
countries or is it more what Aucust say is about
our relationship to other countries who aren't five guys who
I'm you know, our formal alli Australia.
Speaker 2 (02:52):
Certainly, the way that Aucust was announced in September of
twenty twenty one, you know, via the media, surprised both
the French, who had set to conclude a submarine deal
with the Australians, and to the Pacific, who you know,
under things like the Piccatala Declaration on Regional Security, are
obliged to consult on matters of regional security. It kind
of took everyone by surprise, and so you know, ORCUS
(03:14):
is seen as you said squarely, as like a five
eyes thing. It's seen as elevating Australia's position within the
five Eyes, potentially above Canada. It's an expanded security pact
between allies, and it involves the transfer of nuclear submarines,
which is you know, obviously the Pinnacle technology. So it's
a very tight alliance between the anglosphere, and it's been
(03:34):
framed as being directed at China as part of a
broader indo Pacific strategy that seeks to contain China by
extending nuclear deterrence into the north of Australia, developing new
types of advanced warfighting technologies, and linking the industrial military
industrial basis of its meminations. So you know, understanding how
(03:56):
New Zealand might fit into that picture has been a
bit of the work of this and what it means
for other relationships, say with the Pacific or with our
with China. For example.
Speaker 1 (04:06):
Now you mentioned the BacT our declaration. Are that Please
correct me because I'm going on scripture that that declaration
affirms the importance of Pacific solutions for Pacific problems and
consulting with Pacific nations on on on Pacific issues rather
than bringing in an outside solution. The primary is that.
Speaker 2 (04:31):
For me, itar is part of a you know, Pacific
regional security approach which prioritizes through things like boy bi
Qatara or the twenty fiftieth strategy for a Blue Pacific
Continent that solutions to Pacific climate. Pacific security needs, which
are things like nuclear disarment, climate action, human development should
come first and foremost from within the region. AUCUST was
(04:52):
seen as its reliance on nuclear technologies, its military focus.
It's the fact that it's pointed at a very squarely
at one nation and therefore goes against the kind of
regional ethos as friends to all, enemies to none. You know,
it seemed to be kind of incompatible both with you know,
the kind of tenor of Pacific diplomacy, but also you know,
(05:13):
the kind of broader framing of the notion of a
blue Pacific continent versus the end of Pacific strategy. So yeah,
that contradiction places New Zealand awkwardly in the middle.
Speaker 1 (05:23):
And I suppose we saw the declarations sited I think
during the Solomon Islands crisis a few years ago regarding
the Elked Chinese Security Pact. The view of Australia. I
think New Zealand as well, was perhaps that that in
that particular moment there was a sense that the Solomon
Islands were reaching outside of the region before looking to
(05:45):
within the region. And I suppose there's a sense there
might be a sense I'd be very interested to know
what you think of this. There might be a sense
that particularly Australia or maybe New Zealand with August wants
to have it both ways. The ethos of searching from
within for Pacific solutions to security and climate needs is
used to keep China out of the region in situations
like the on of the Islands. It doesn't seem to
(06:07):
be enforced in the same way against Australia and New Zealand,
who who look for security outside of the region themselves.
Is that there is there a hypocrisy there or is.
Speaker 2 (06:17):
New Zealand's regional security policy long standing is one of
strategic denial and so the family first model of regional
security through Pacific regionalism itself is part of that strategy. So, yes,
there is a double standard in so far as New Zealand,
you know, historically through anzas or Australia continues that that
(06:39):
they do play it both ways between the Western Alliance
and their their regional partners in PIFF and Asian You know,
so that is that is.
Speaker 1 (06:47):
What do you make of the Chinese strikeforce currently wanting
its way down the east coast of Australia. Look, they
haven't said the sun this yet, but I imagine and
in future debates around orchest Australia will say, well, look,
this is an example of China projecting its showing that
it has the ability to project power in the region,
and things like Aucust will be necessary. I mean, the
sub the pure submarine component of August Pilla one will
(07:09):
be necessary to ensure that that Australia can project back
or maintain I suppose a forward projection themselves.
Speaker 2 (07:16):
I mean, that's the core debate at the heart of
August Pillar one discussions in Australia is the extent to
which their force posture, Well, the defense capability should be
linked with their force posture and foreign policy generally. So,
for example, if Australia seeks to be a middle power
seeking security in Asia, is a nuclear submarine capability that
(07:37):
is designed to you know, project forward into Go one
straight and appropriate capability. Similarly, you know, there are those
within Australia, you know, x people, intelligence community, former foreign ministers,
former defense chiefs that believe that Australia's force posture should
be focused on the defense of continents of Australia. So
(07:59):
you know that group of Chinese warships that are making
its way to the Tasman the nuclear submarine capability that
they're describing, you know, it's there's a question about whether
it could actually operate in and around continents Australia versus
say much more of the types of the diesel electric
submarines and so on and so forth. So yeah, there's
(08:20):
a question about, Yeah, the appropriateness of ORCUS, and I
think that raises questions for New Zealand two. And it's
consideration of Pillar two. If we think about this tension
between New Zealand having a balance forced or operating in
the realm kind of with this humanitarian assistance and disaster
response focus, maritime security focus, whether or not the kind
(08:42):
of high tech war fighting capabilities that are all about
remote targeting or hyposonic missiles drones, and whether or not
we should be expeditionary in our force, and how much
interoperability we should have with US forward power prediction. I
think these are questions that need to be asked about
our considered of Aucust. Is it fit for purpose in
(09:02):
what we need to do? Is it helping us to
do best? And I think if one is serious about
genuine regional security, or one is seeking to contribute to
the deterring or denying of China, is it best to
do so militarily or through August? Because I don't think
that that case has necessarily been made out. And then
the other thing is about those types of technologies, what
(09:25):
technologies could we get bilaterally or through five Eyes. So
I think that there are certain assumptions within that, you know,
that kind of point towards August, but they haven't really
been questioned.
Speaker 1 (09:34):
Right, so just to look into that a wee bit so.
And I think Labor might have made this argument itself
in New Zealand, that New Zealand already has a significant
sort of relationship with those countries five five eyes, and
if there is a sort of a case for technology
sharing and interoperability, perhaps that could be made through the
either for five eyes intelligence sharing or call what the
(09:54):
five country There are I think thirty five country agreements
that exist between those those five countries, and it might
be better to explore that rather than via do you
think and in terms of the other point you raised
there that the Chinese deterrence or deterring China in the
Pacific militarily or via other means, what sort of other
(10:15):
means do you think would be I mean at the
disposal of Australia and New Zealand.
Speaker 2 (10:21):
Well, I think that there's diplomacy and development. I think
if we look at our long term regional security policy,
it's been about frustrating opportunities for outside powers to gain
a regional foothold. And I think this kind of moved
towards deterrence, military deterrence through defense capability and this new
assertive posture we see with when Saint Peter's in the region.
And we can talk about Kidibus and Cook Islands later,
(10:44):
but I think that that kind of shift and then
the denial of saying indigenous led foreign policy and things
like that, you know, it's a question of is this
actually working to counter China in the region, Because I
think asked Mark Brown it didn't deter him at all.
I think we should be realistic about our capability and
I think That's another thing that those that are skeptical
(11:05):
of aucust in Australia raised. It's like, you know, you
can spend three hundred and sixty eight billion Australian dollars
for you know, up to eight nuclear submarines in thirty
years time. People are talking about twenty twenty seven. You know,
what is what use is one thing. It's the same
as New Zealand. We can spend a lot of money
on expensive military capabilities, or we can do probably what
(11:27):
we're better at, which is soft power. And I think
that soft power also gives us flexibility. We're seeing the
US become increasingly riven by domestic political instability. They're still
involved in disastrous misadventure overseas, and I think that question
of them withdrawing, you know, but still being very intervenious,
you know, this kind of question about Trump. You know,
(11:48):
I think New Zealand is more flexible, It's more able
to work north and south and east to west with
this kind of more independent, regionally centered foreign policy. And
I think that historically that's ironically not only the basis
of independent foreign policy, but it's a strategic contribution to
the Western Alliance at the time because we've been able
to do things that the are larger, less flexible powers can't,
(12:10):
you know. And so it's yeah, in.
Speaker 1 (12:12):
The speech when some Peter's made on Wednesday night, the
message on AID, which in case is a significant part
of this is more with less development assistance. And that
comes at a time when I mean, it's unclear what
is happening with the US AID and the Pacific, but
one would have to think it's probably not good for
you or expecting the current level of contribution to stay
where it is. I think the Lower Institute has about
(12:34):
three billion dollars of US AID over the last or
ten years in the US dollars being spent in the Pacific.
And if you know, if if if US aid, if
the US is sort of putting the screws that on
that spending and New Zealand is looking at spending less,
I mean, that does open up an opportunity for another power,
perhaps China, to fill the breach.
Speaker 2 (12:55):
Certainly it won't help, although I would note that you know,
it's probably more new wants in that in terms of
if the US pull out, Pacific nations are not just
going to go to China. You know, they have a
long experience of managing geostrategic competition, and they will be
concerned by what it means for regional institutions US say
(13:17):
dropping out. But you see with Vanuatu historically, you know,
a member of the non line of movement, committed to
decolonization regionally some of the most creative things like the
Fossil Fuel Non Proliferation Treaty. You know that the new
Prime Minister Napa has said, we want to work with
the US. So they're they're canny, like Pacific nations are
clever and they have agency and so yeah, I don't
(13:41):
think it's it's just a case of zero sum. I think.
I think. And it's also you know, when we talk
about this geo strategic competition, it's not just China in
the US, It's a whole host of other It's really
congested regional space is the EU, there's and there's other
players that are in there you know, less frequently and
they pull out and whatever. But yeah, it's it's an
(14:04):
interesting time to study Pacific geopolitics.
Speaker 1 (14:07):
How do you feel about obviously this is a French
domestic issue as well, the ongoing involvement in France and
the Pacific and via the flare up in New Caledonia
last last year. Writers have made the point that but
potentially one of one of France's desires to stay involved
in the region is itself basing and Pacific countries and
(14:29):
the ability to project power again in the Pacific. That
too suggests like US, China and France itself a Middle
European power. Certainly, France frames itself as a middle global
Indo Pacific power, and New Caledonia and French Polynesia or
are a vital part of that. I think that we
should be realistic though New Caledonia is our closest geographic
(14:50):
neighbor and an anachronistic French colonialism are powered by force
in the deployment of six thousand gendarmes and their undemocratic
electoral reforms are sewing instability in our region. And so
this talk of oh what would a New Caledonia, an
independent New Caledonia mean, and would this be you know,
put would they be pushed into China? But you know,
(15:12):
an indigenous population has been denied the right to self determination. Yeah,
it's an analienable right. New Zealanders stresses its defense cooperation
with the French armed forces in New Caledonia. But we
need to be clear. This is this is Western self
injury that's caused us. You know, there's been tens of
thousands of people that have lost their jobs, billions of dollars.
Is an economic and social crisis. They're under curfew for
(15:34):
six like six months, you know, and New Zealand just
evacuated our people. And what's the situation there now? It's
it's it's it's really concerning what should New Zealand do
in this In this regard, it's a stranger game situation,
I guess, and perhaps you can enlighten me as to
the sort of international legal situation, a game for the
(15:56):
back at our idea of Pacific regionalism that it seems
sort of counter to that a domestic situation and a
Pacific country in New Caledonia is being treated as a
kind of a very sort of early tweenth century, nineteenth
century kind of case of, to put it down charitably,
(16:17):
a crisis of imperialism almost where where it's a flear
up on the periphery that needs the metropolit to kind
of reach out and to make it down, to put
it very crudely, that too seems just a challenge to
everything we think about or all of the received wisdom
of how we have structured the way that Pacific politics
and regionalism should work.
Speaker 2 (16:37):
Certainly there's a role for the region to play. I mean,
it's considered to be an internal manner for France, but
New Caledonia is a full member of the Pacific Calan's Forum,
and so you know, the sending of a Troika observation
mission at the end of last year, you know, it
was a way for to seek, you know, an independent view,
ask about you know, what the political future is for
(16:58):
New Caledonia and its relationship and eventual integration with the region.
Should note that, you know, New Zealand was part of
these discussions right through the seventies and into the eighties.
When U Caleedoni was reinscribed on the twenty of twenty
four for declonization. At the time, diplomats did state that
they thought that declonization of New Caledoni would be inevitable.
(17:19):
We seem to have stepped away from that because of convenience,
because of broader geopolitical imperatives. But the people that suffer sufferer,
indigenous people on the ground.
Speaker 1 (17:28):
We're just going to take a quick break and then
come back to talking about the Cook Islands, political dilima
of the last couple of weeks and the comprehensive strategic
partnership that Mike Mark has signed with China. Hello, and
(17:54):
welcome back to On the Titles. I'm here with lecturer
Marco Young, who is discussing a range of specific political
policy on the On the Titles podcast. So Marca, can
we just can we talk about the Cook Islands now?
Obviously everyone's been watching the situation of the last couple
of weeks Worth New Zealand and Winston Peters in particular
(18:14):
getting pretty frustrated about the level of consultation that Wellington
received over the confrehensive strategic partnership that the Prime Minister
Mark Brown was looking to sign with China and then
did sign and other agreements. Mark Brown says, yes, look,
I think it's the two thousand and one partnership. The
declaration does stipulate the consultation, but the consultation that he
(18:37):
gave was not to see the agreements. The declaration doesn't
stipulate the level of consultation, so he believes he lived
up to the agreement himself. What's what's your sort of
take on what's.
Speaker 2 (18:46):
Going on here?
Speaker 1 (18:46):
Is it a the two thousand and one declaration no
longer fit for purpose? In certainly seems to be what
Winston Peters was saying on Wednesday. Or is this just
a case of a wrinkle in a usually fairly strong relationship.
Speaker 2 (18:59):
What's I think it's being framed as a situation where
Cook Islands wants its cake. I eat the New Zealand
passport and eat it too. I know, act as a
full independent sovereign state. And there's a suggestion that like
it's desired international personality and its financial entanglements through things
like the shipping register or and as out of step
(19:25):
with its constitutional reality. What I have felt has been
missing from the discussion is an honest accounting of what
New Zealand stands, you know, gains from the realm status
of the Cook Islands that you know it's it gives
us a status that we wouldn't otherwise have as a
small power. It gives us a friend or a proxy
(19:49):
in international negotiations of which Cook Islands is a part.
When the self government and free association relationship was formalized
in nineteen sixty five, you know, New Zealand was able
to dispensive its col new obligations, and it did so
because it had stewarded through decolonization as ah in nineteen
sixty two, and that has been the basis that support
(20:11):
for Pacific decolonization and its acceptance with African states has
been part of our you know, liberal international image, and
it's given us credibility on the global stage is a
good faith multilateral actor, and that's part of the reasons
say we've got to sit on the security count one
twenty seventeen. So I think, you know, that special relationship
(20:33):
and the way that it was negotiated, I think that,
you know, that's kind of missing from an honest accounting.
New Zealand's scene is benevolent and it's been frustrated by
these little partners that won't play games. You know that.
What I really despise about how this has transpired is
that New Zealand has kind of held the passport over
the Cook Islands people, and it's made reference frequently to
(20:54):
the Cook Islands people, implying that there's an undemocratic thing
that's happening. Well, there's a gap between you know, the
elites that interested in deep sea mining and signing these
clandestine dealers with China versus the people, and it's created
domestic political unrest is a big protest. And but we
should ask who the who the audience for this political
theater is. And there's a suggestion that it's actually five
(21:15):
Vised Nations that New Zealand is trying to with as
part of this kind of new assertive posture. It's trying
to show that we're not going to lose our you know,
these outposts to China. And I think that that you know,
the stakes are not probably not as high as they
as they're made out to be, right, and so I
think that that's it's not really honest.
Speaker 1 (21:37):
Certainly, if New Zealand is trying to deepen its relationship
with Five Eyes and and and show its value to
the Vvised Nations, well, the value isn't The value isn't
the zero points even to one point two percent of
GDP that we spend on defense, which is depending on
how you measure it, it's very low defense spending both
normally because GDP isn't very large, and as a percentage
(21:58):
of GDP we have, yeah, a very one I think,
very little value to those to those countries of anything.
But I suppose one of the things that New Zealand
does bring us a large exclusive economic zone and territorial projection,
which is precisely what the cooks deliver.
Speaker 2 (22:15):
We should be asking, you know, what is New Zealand's
geostrategic value in this new rivalry. And the suggestion is,
as you say, it's not probably not defense bend, but
we're a flag you know, in a coalition of the willing.
We have a unique geography for things like space launchers.
We have a large exclusive economic zone, some of which
(22:36):
has polymetallic nodules, critical mineral supply chains. You know, these
are the types of questions that are being asked of
New Zealand when we consider things like orcusts or the
way this is all playing out. You know, Minister Collins
has been explicit that this is part of part of
this question is what does New Zealand bring to the table.
My question is, you know, is this in our national interest?
(22:57):
And how is our national interest being constructed? I would
say that thirty percent of our population are Maloro Pacific.
We are in and of the Pacific. We have a
non discretionary interest in Pacific security that is not shared
by larger outside powers. We're linked by our geography, demography,
our genealogy in a way that means that what happens
(23:18):
in the region matters deeply to us. And with things
like climate, climate breakdown, increasing disaster, wealth inequality, political instability,
space launchers to contribute to satellite warfare, are buying one
frigate to be part of a carrier strike group that's
going to find in Taiwan. Actually what we need actually
how we see our role in the region. Is it
(23:39):
a powerful version, version or vision for New Zealand. You know,
I think that the world has changed, and I think
that actually the geostrategic calculus has changed in a way
that probably means that it's not just about them getting
a base in the Cook Islands. It's more about all
kinds of other stuff.
Speaker 1 (23:57):
Isn't the defensive Taiwan You could you could put a
specific leans on that it's a small independent Well, it's
a large island and the question of independence is a
vexed one, but it is a self governing ireland threatened
by a large regional power. President that a large a
large regional power can just do what it likes to
(24:18):
a neighbor, you know, accepting all of our history the president,
there would be a worrying one for small island states
like New Zealand by the Pacific, and therefore one would
think that there is an argument to line up on
the defense on the side of the defense of Taiwan
against China, if that, if that were to the conflict,
where do you transpire? And hopefully it won't, But but
(24:39):
you know that that is the argument. I suppose that
that that you might make what you to make.
Speaker 2 (24:43):
That I'm so concerned about what's happening in Ukraine where
two superpowers are seen to be outside just carving up,
you know, and that seems to be in violation of
international law, the multilateral system, you know. And I think
we should stand on New Zealand's principles. Certainly, I think
that the Pacific have its own relationships, and it's a
(25:06):
long standing debate about nations lining up on China's side
taiwan side. Yeah, But I think for New Zealand, I'm
struck by the example in nineteen seventy five Full of Saigon,
the US withdraw from the region. We're seen to withdraw
from the region in nineteen seventy eight under the muld
Doing government. Dennis McLain rights a foreign policy for the
(25:29):
first time, centering New Zealand's defense on the Pacific, and
it talks about coast of defense, Ireland defense, you know,
as opposed to forward defense against communism in Asia, and
a part of it is a budgetry thing. The all
shocks have been it's like a difficult time. So I think,
(25:50):
you know, there's a case as these things move around,
like the Ukraine thing, you could line up on one side,
but then the whole rugg is pulled underneath you. I think,
you know, increased self reliance or collective security in your
immediate region, things that will not change, rather than reliance
on the whims of superpowers, is a more flexible and
grounded strategy.
Speaker 1 (26:10):
Right, But the Prince, I suppose the principle of your
territorial integrity, the principle of a rules based order, meaning
that regional powers cannot just absorb or muck around there
the smaller neighbors. Again, obviously the complex there is a
complexity around just what Taiwan is. With that, I mean
there are suppose there are two ways of looking at
the Taiwan issue, which is a West versus the kind
(26:33):
of very black and white kind of Cold War framing.
And then there's a there is a principle about the
extent to which a large regional power is allowed to
dictate terms to its smaller neighbors. And I suppose the
second that second way of looking at that issue as
as slightly more sale against for small countries like New Zealand,
which you know, I suppose traditionally we have lined up
on the west side of the West versus East thing,
(26:54):
but in the last thirty years have reassessed that. But
we've never I guessed, we have really from the idea
that that larger countries should not be able to boss
around small.
Speaker 2 (27:03):
Or on one thing I've been really excited to hear
about this week at PIPSA has been this discussion of
the Zone of Peace, and part of that has been
lined up around things like territorial integrity and you know,
what a rules based order for the Pacific, you know,
for the Pacific would look like, or what you know,
how and how the region might come together and insulate
itself from the worst excesses of geopolitical rivalry. And there's
(27:26):
discussion of things like, you know, what would a Pacific
peace look like? How would you define it? There are
civil society groups that comment and you know, there should
be no peace without justice things, no peace without decolonization,
no peace without gender equity, without nuclear justice without climate action.
There are others that think that this is an opportunity
to you know, rationalize the regional security architecture and bring
(27:46):
things like that the Australian lead initiatives like the Policing
Initiative or the Pacific Response Group under the South Pacific
Defense min It's meaning bring it under the of the
Pacific Ards Forum. And I think that that's kind of
like that discussion is about what you talk. It's about,
you know, how does a region come together and try
and you know, come up with a set of rules
even and as the great powers are now doing as
(28:09):
what great powers do in the US, I mean, part
of the Ukraine thing seems to be a new Monroe
doctrine because the the you know, Trump is talking about
taking Greenland, Panama, Canada, you know, and it seems like
if that's the case, that's a you know, a regional
power seeking to absorb it absorbits, you know, and it's
the same and so if that's the case, and if
that's the agreement, then maybe we see the US step
(28:33):
back from its its current posture in Asia, and that
would be a very different conversation about Taiwan. And who knows,
it could change very quickly. I mean it certainly changed
very quickly in the case of Ukraine, and it would
be very uncomfortable for Australia and New Zealand, especially Australia
which currently is you know, you know, hosting nuclear extended
deterrence through the B fifty two's that are rotating through
(28:56):
from Guam into the Northern Territory or you know, set
to like nuclear cable submarines, so it's really you know,
they could be left out on them.
Speaker 1 (29:06):
The final question a bit of a curveball. I'm afraid
you mentioned the nodules, the mineral nodules, the undersea stuff.
Is there any sense that I saw in the strategic
partnership document released by the Cook Islands that China was
hoping to assist with some of the deep sea mining
Cooks have been keen to look at deep sea mining. Obviously,
(29:26):
there's a sort of an economic challenge that the Cooks
are facing, being no longer i think a developing country
and therefore not liable to receive the same development and
assistance that they might have done in the past, as
they are relatively higher income country, not great and looking
to sort of to diversify the local economy. Is there
(29:49):
a sense that the Americans are getting a weaver at
frost or that the Americans with themselves perhaps like to
get their hands on some of that deep sea resource,
so that it seems like there is a global battle.
And then it speaks to your remarks about Greenland before.
It seems like there is a global battle between these
shoe superbowers to consolidate supply chains right down to the
(30:09):
raw mineral harvesting in their own interest. Are you aware
of any aspects of that regarding the sort of spat
over the Cook Islands.
Speaker 2 (30:16):
The Cook Islands has sought assistance with the exploration in
their exclusive economic zone, and obviously there's this difference between
the harvesting potentially and the clarion clippet and is a
kind of thing, and then the domestic exploration in the
Cooks and then this question about how that works with
the region deeply remains of very divisive issue. You know,
Nauru Cook Islands at various times popping in any town,
(30:38):
get a bus. You know, maybe divergent positions about this
and others care for a regional moratorium. New Zealand has
been in support of regional moratorium, although with Shane Jones
and the baby big thing, you know, there's a question
about New Zealand's support for things like that or even
it's climate ongoing climate commitment. So it's part of this
broader picture about how there's the kind of under the
(31:01):
new coalition government with the contradictions between the way New
Zealand likes to act in the region and it's kind
of domestic populism or nationalism. And we saw this big
spatter its Sprifmo and Shane Jones and fishing this last
week and it's an interesting one. I think the geopolitical
calculus is there and so far as you know, from
(31:22):
what I know, I'm not sure that there's been an
economic case for so I think the geopolitical thing comes
into substance what is otherwise potentially not you know, it's
self sustaining industry, So yeah, that certainly comes into it.
It's also linked with orcus I think. You know, if
you look at this and people testifying in Congress, there's
(31:42):
footage of them talking about the links between all of
those types of things and the industrial based integration. Yeah.
So it's it's certainly big power plays and we're small
islands drifting on really you know, dangerous waters.
Speaker 1 (31:56):
I think so the the orchest implication of the deep
sea mining is is that is the Americans are thinking, well,
we need to continue to cement to soeuves and established
relationships in the region because it has an important supply
chain implication for us. Or are the minerals the minerals
aren't used for the submarines.
Speaker 2 (32:15):
No, no, yeah, it's Australia obviously as a vast mineral
wealth too. And yes, you know, it's also interesting New
Caledonia and the French or even though most of the
nickel from New Caledonia goes to China, it's what is
a strategic mineral to this question of like what the
French that can appropriate from the domestic you know, it's
all of these questions. I think back to the law
of the See negotiations and this distinction between for common humanity.
(32:39):
And then it's kind of the large maritime powers. We're
kind of seeing that player now and I'm concerned New
Zealand is stepping back from its role as kind of
like a champion for the multilateral solutions and finding common interest,
especially in the region. But that's one of the region.
That's one of the issues that divide us in the region.
Speaker 1 (32:55):
We've gone all day. Thank you very much. That was
very that was very interesting, very greatfully for you making
time in the conference program to come and talk to us.
That was on the task for another week. We're on
iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcast. We're going to
have a local edition next week where Georgina Campbell is
going to discuss local politics, and then we'll be we'll
be back the week after that. So thank you very
(33:17):
much for listening and come back
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