November 24, 2009 • 24 mins
In this episode of Stuff You Should Know, Josh and Chuck discuss nuclear profliferation, nuclear parity and the Cold War strategic doctrine called Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
Welcome to Stuff you should know from House Stuff Works
dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh
Clark with me as always as the lovely and talented
Charles W. Chuckers Bryant. Hi, Hey, Chuck. Hi. See you
switched hats uh from When to Win from the Chicago
(00:24):
Bears hat to the Atlanta Braves hate. That was yesterday
today today. You're a man of many hats, John, many
fan allegiances. I'm not a Bears fan. You know what
that was all done? Punkin's Yes, punkin Chunkin, Yes, Josh.
We are going to mention once again. The Discovery Channel
are awesome. Parent company is releasing two television shows on
(00:45):
Thanksgiving night. Don't confuse people, Chuck. They're gonna be on
the Science Channel well on Thursday, November twenty six, which
is Thanksgiving. That's a dead dead turkeys that day, The
Road to Punkin Chunkin and Punkin Chunkin Right. The Road
to Punkin Chunking comes on eight pm Eastern Time on
the Science Channel, followed by the Real punkin Chunking at
(01:06):
nine pm Eastern. I would follow it up with a
show called The Road from Punkin Film Right Going back
home after punkin chunking in Delaware. No less, So that's
that right? Sure? Alrighty so Chuck, Yes, Josh, Um, this
I have like a little this seems vaguely familiar. We're
talking about mutual assured destruction. Okay, well, how does that
(01:27):
seem familiar? Because I did it with Candice many many
moons ago on Stuffy miss in history class, back when
it was called factor fiction. Dude, that was another lifetime,
wasn't it. It really was. I have so many more
gray hairs now, and like my posture is much more
stooped the Seattle slump I do. Actually, nice one, Chuck.
(01:49):
We've talked about this, I think here there we've mentioned it.
Remember we did a podcast on how easy is it
is steal a nuclear bomb? We concluded that if the
Jamaicans are buying it and you steal it en route
to Maka, you can probably get away with it. Um.
This podcast is specifically on a Cold War strategic doctrine
(02:10):
called mutual issued destruction, which was abbreviated as MAD appropriately enough. Yeah,
it's funny. It's like it's scary as I'll get out,
but it's also comforting in the same breath, it's weird.
Well yeah, because I mean, if you think about it,
you and I grew up we were Cold War babies,
and we grew up with the express knowledge that at
any moment nuclear wark breakout and if that happened, everyone
(02:34):
on the planet was debt. And like, that's how we
were raised, like kids that were born like what in
like mid eighties today, which is just nuts to me
that there's people walking around that are sentient that we're
born in the mid eighties. But kids that were born
in the mid eighties and after did not grow up
with that specter looming over him, and I imagine are
completely different people personality wise than like you and I. Well,
(02:55):
that's like everyone else on our staff almost agreed. Do
you ever think about that? I did not. There are
a few old folks like us, although I'm much older
than you. Obviously. You definitely point out checks wearing right
now a Jeane jacket with a sharpie marker used to
to do the Journey logo on the back. It's pretty
pretty cool. Check you burnout. Um, So Chuck, as I
(03:19):
was saying, we grew up as as Cold War kids, um,
and every once in a while you have to stop
and think, why didn't the US and the USS are
blow one another up? Are you asking me that? Yeah, well,
let's talk about the Cold world, because the answer is
the end of the podcast, all right, So let's save that,
all right, The Cold War, Josh, I had a couple
(03:40):
of really scary moments. If you want to talk about those,
I do. The Cuban missile crisis was a pretty tense
a couple of weeks. Probably the first one in nine two,
President Kennedy threatened to strike once he found out that
Russia had moved or I guess the Soviet Union had
moved missiles to Cuba, and we're pointing them at his face.
And Cuba seems like a world away, but it's really
(04:02):
just ninety miles off the southern coast of Florida, a
short boat ride, right, And so if you have nuclear,
long range nuclear warheads pointed at the US, they can
hit their mark, probably as far as Kansas City, let's say,
and they could definitely hit temperature. That was a scary
couple of weeks. Sure it was because there was a standoff. Basically,
(04:23):
we were saying, hey, we're gonna nuke you if you
don't remove these missiles and the Soviet Union said, oh yeah,
well we'll nuke you back. And actually you can, actually
you can. You can point to this is perhaps the
beginning of the mad doctrine. And the other scary one
was in weird Chuck, This actually happened like several times.
(04:48):
This is probably the worst. That's some bad communication going on.
What happened was, Uh, nora Ad got some information that
the Soviet Union had launched two thousand, two hundred and
twenty nuclear missiles our way. So chuck, Yeah, UM in
nora Ad, which is like our the command center for
our missile system defense deep in Shyenne Mountain in Colorado. UM,
(05:13):
on some computer screen, some guys computer screen that that
tracks UM Soviet missile movement. All of a sudden, it
was just peppered with missiles that were coming this way.
And and UM National Security Director of Brasniski. Nice jobs that, right,
I think it's right. I can't remember a lot of continants.
(05:35):
And it's not that I can't remember, it's that I've
never heard it. Prasinski, We're going with Prasinski. Um, he
was alerted. It's pretty early in the morning, right, yeah,
two am. He was alerted and woken up and they're like, hey,
there's a Soviet missile strike and all out missile strike,
twenty missiles coming our way, sir, and he is picking
(05:56):
up the phone to call President Carter, who I don't
know what Carter would have done. Carter wasn't exactly um,
the most militant president we've ever had. Great guy, great statesmen,
great diplomat. He might have pooped his pants and gone
back to bed, you know, maybe so um, but the
terrible um he he never got that phone call because
(06:19):
Brazinski was informed that, oh wait, it's a computer glitch.
They whacked the side of the monitor and it all corrected.
That said. What shocked me was it was a seven
minute window that we had to decide what to do. Well,
it's a long way from the Soviet Union to the US,
even by way of Alaska. Seven minutes. S Yeah, you
(06:40):
have to make up your mind in seven minutes whether
or not you're going to destroy the world. Basically, I'm saying,
you would think that it would be less than seven minutes. Okay,
so so, and I'm telling you like that was probably
the worst case. But that happened many times during the
course of the Cold War. And from what I understand,
the Soviets had similar incidents too, right, yeah, so we
have these incidents, we have the human missile crisis. Why
(07:03):
didn't either side pull the trigger? Because of the doctrine,
the mad doctrine basically, which indicates that everyone will die.
So the uh, you know, we blow everybody up on
both sides, So let's not do that, right, And the
U s SR In the United States could actually very
(07:23):
quickly from seven and nineteen forty one, both nations were
building up their nuclear arsenals, which is called nuclear proliferation. Right,
I think I got that out, um in the nuclear
proliferation Do you take that one for the rest of
the podcast. Okay, okay, okay, um? And uh they so
each side had this arsenal and we're keeping up in
(07:44):
step with one another. You know what. That's called nuclear parity,
which is ideally what you want. Strangely, yes, in this case,
you definitely do. So both sides had more than enough
nuclear missiles to wipe out not just the other side,
but the tire planet. Several times over. That's a really
important point. Several times over. Why would you need a
(08:08):
nuclear arsenal that could wipe out the world, the planet
several times over. Now, maybe if they destroyed some of
our weaponry with their strikes, that's part of it. But
another part of it is because if one side adds
a missile, you gotta add a missile. Well if you
if you're seeking nuclear parity, which is really important, um,
(08:28):
then you there can't be. It can't be out of whack.
How did they did they release all this information to
each other? Was it? No? It was intelligence guesses that
kind of stuff, Like all of a sudden, there's like
a metal hole in the ground in Wyoming that wasn't
there before. The Soviets probably assumed, well, they have a
new nuclear warhead there. They didn't I m each other
and say built new messile. L o O click you're
(08:51):
going to say that. I knew you were going to
say that. So both sides are building up their arsenal.
And early on, Chuck Um, I was reading another article
on game theory which will see plays into this, written
by our steem colleague and might be ff Tom sheeve Um,
and he talks about how early on, apparently Eisenhower, who
is uh what, the second president to have the bomb,
(09:14):
but really the first president to manage like an amassed
nuclear arsenal. He yeah, he stopped worrying. Um. He looked
at them as like any other type of weapon, because
he was a military man. Um. But luckily there was
a game theorist named Thomas Shelling, who had the ear
of Eisenhower, managed to convince him that no, no, no,
(09:35):
these things are way way more powerful and destructive than
anything else in our arsenal. They exist in this in
this vacuum that has to be kept separate, and therefore
they should be viewed only as deterrence. And he managed
to change Eisenhower's view, and from that point on it
was the presence of a nuclear arsenal was a weapon
(09:57):
in and of itself. It was the preventative and not
only to nuclear war. But the point that did you
write this one, uh, The point that you made, which
I found interesting was that it also was a deterrent
to conventional war. Excellent point, because conventional war they're really after.
After the arms race, there was no such thing as
conventional war. No, and um, not between the U S
(10:18):
and the U S s R. Right, or a guaranteed
conventional war. It might start out that way, but it
would escalate and all of a sudden the button is
pushed at some point, right, because our nuclear arsenal did
exist and say, a vacuum outside of the rest of
our arsenal. But once you exhausted the rest of the arsenal,
then the inevitable conclusion was that that nuclear arsenal being deployed. Right,
(10:38):
or even if you didn't exhaust it, even if you
just said you just got man, let's just end this
game exactly. Um. So, as a result, the US and
the USS are just fought a Cold war. They never
directly engaged with another, but they fought one another through
proxy wars in places like Nicaragua in Afghanistan. Right, um
got a lot of good movies out of the Cold War,
definitely Rambo three and a good some good James Bond
(11:01):
movies in that time. I liked it when the Rooskies
were the villain. It was you like the James Bond
movies of the Cold Well, okay, yeah, maybe the early ones.
I'm thinking like Timothy Dalton there, yeah, I mean, trust me,
Roger Moore is kind of a laughable Bond. Now that
I'm older and looked back, You're crazy. Roger Moore is
the best team because we grew up with him. But
looking back, I mean, come on, Roger Moore was kind
of a dufe maybe, but that was I think that
(11:24):
was his director that he was working with. I kind
of like Pierce bros And and and he was good. He
was okay, I'm pretty hip on the Daniel Craig. He's
all right, Well that's the only direction they could take.
That really left blonde. No, just uh more realistic butt
kicking with fists and that kind of thing. You don't
think Moonraker was realistic, you know, he was constantly like
winking at the camp. Yeah, it's like Jonathan Strickland is
(11:50):
James Bond. I guess good one. Alright, so sorry about
the sidetrack. Yeah, what happened was we created a detent.
It wasn't like, Okay, we all have the same amount
of weapons, so we're BFFs now and it's all good.
It was a day tome, meaning it was sort of
a what's the best description, an uneasy truce. Yeah. Yeah, so, um, basically,
(12:11):
the US and the USSR had our weapons and we're
keeping an eye on one another, and anytime one added
a new missile or some new capability, the other scrambled
to catch up and vice versa, and we just basically
went to sleep with one eye open for the next
several decades. Right. Uh So, Josh, what two things have
to take place in order to achieve this uh weird stability. Well,
(12:33):
the weird stability the very fact that it existed. It's
not it wasn't an organic Um, it wasn't organically created
by the presence of nuclear weapons. Right. Um. Henry Kissinger,
who was Secretary of State throughout much of the Cold War, Um,
he actually was a huge fan of game theory. He
(12:53):
took a lot of game theory classes when he was
an underclassman at Harvard, and he kept in touch with
game theory and hung out with game theorists, and he
actually was one of the people who was responsible for
applying game theory to nuclear strategy. Yeah, and other people
kind of caught on and saw that there was a
lot of merit and validity to to viewing um, nuclear
(13:16):
strategy through game theory. Right. Um, So the two things
really are having that I'll answer my own question that
what's key is a to have the weapons to begin with.
And then, as Robert McNamara points out, the Defense Secretary
in nineteen sixties was that you have to believe that
the other guys actually has the cojones to pull the trigger, right,
(13:37):
And apparently both the US and the USS are like
to leak false information about how crazy their leaders were.
Do you remember how we were brought up viewing like
the Russians like they were all nuts, right, and they
would just push the button at any second. Yeah, they
wanted American blood. Apparently that was planted by the Russians,
because you have to believe that the other guy is
(13:59):
willing to strike and and not just create a first strike,
but definitely a counter strike as well. Right, sure, So
if you are assured that if you launch a first
strike that the next the other sides going to launch
a retaliatory strike, what you've just done by launching that
first strike is committed suicide. Pretty much. The basis of
(14:21):
mutual assured destruction is that nobody wants to die, right Okay? Yeah, yeah, okay?
And uh also at the time, I mean, at first,
the way the nuclear warheads um developed over the years
is pretty cool because, like you pointed out, at first,
it was just a big, huge, dopey bomb that would
(14:41):
just blow up everything. Yeah, have you seen pictures of
Fat Boy and Little Man. They really do they do?
The money would drop out of the back of a plane. Yeah,
did you know they weren't the same type of bomb.
Fat Man, which was dropped on Nagasaki was plutonium and
a Little Boy, which was dropped on Hiroshima was uranium. Interesting,
I didn't know that, and they were. They were working
(15:02):
on both of these. So basically we split the atom
in the like for the late thirties and all of
a sudden, we're just working on any kind of atomic
bomb we want nuts. So over the years though that
it became very precise and much more strategic, so you could, um,
let's say, send your nuclear warheads to specific military targets
at first, obviously to wipe out, you know, some of
(15:22):
that capability. Hold on, you're talking about escalation. Let's talk
about the nuclear proliferation. It wasn't just a ladder of escalation. Well,
hold on, let's talk about where the nukes were, right,
and so at the height of the Cold War, it
wasn't just missile silos and wyoming and you know this Ukraine,
it was um, there was the European theater, Eastern and
(15:42):
Western we had nuclear warheads all over the place there
um at any given time, both the Soviets and the
US had aircraft in the air at any point in
time with nuclear with nukes, right, we had nuclear submarines
all over the globe, so lancey and air both sides
had it covered. Right. So okay, we're the world is
completely covered with thermonuclear devices, very high tech delivery systems
(16:08):
specific and both sides have enough to wipe the other
one off the planet several times. We're at a day time, right,
So what happens if somebody does launch a first strike
because it's no longer a holocaust where we're just shooting
missiles anymore, we have the capability to launch precise surgical strike. Well,
there will be a counter strike, there is. But this
(16:30):
is where the ladder of escalation you were talking about
comes in. Well, yeah, you like in it to a
chess game, there's a strike than a counter strike, and
then you know increasing levels of of strikes as they
climb up the ladder. Right now, So basically, yeah, it's
like trading punches, right, right, So you start out, you
start out soft, and I hit you. I don't you
(16:52):
bring it all from the beginning. Then I'm really glad
you weren't at the helm of the United States or
the uss are during the Cold War. But let's say
let's say we were evenly matched, right, and I punch you,
you punched me a little harder, I punch you a
little harder, and then uh, it keeps going on until
finally one of us like, okay, stop. But what we've
done is we've escalated the damage we're doing to one another.
(17:16):
But there's something very important that that's easily overlooked in
that trade of punches. There's a moment that comes after
each punch where someone might quit, where somebody has the
options to quit right or trade another punch. And if
you trade another punch, you're gonna escalate. Right. So if
in the case of nuclear arms that are real precise
at this point, they take out a few of our
(17:38):
military bases, we take a few of their's are out,
and all of a sudden, one of the leaders steps
back and says, wait a minute, we're gonna annihilate everybody.
We have to stop. You win, right exactly. Um, And
what's crazy is it's like the fact that there would
even be a retaliatory strike is all based on saving face,
which is kind of disgusting in and of itself. But um, yeah,
(18:01):
both sides had this kind of agreement. I can't remember
it was called where it's It's like in the ladder
of escalation. First to start with like say nuclear silo,
and then you the next the next wrong on the
ladder is you know, actual troops, right, and then the
next wrong after that is like maybe a rural area.
Then after that it is like a city, and it
(18:21):
keeps you going and I aming each other between give up.
Yet both sides knew what was coming next. It was
part of the ladder of escalation. Yeah, luckily we never
engaged in that. Luckily there was no instant messaging back
then too. I know it would have been fun or
it could have saved us that well, I guess we
we were saved. But chuck, um, I know you recognize
the ladder of escalation because your favorite movie or one
(18:44):
of them had this factor heavily into four games. What
did we talk about this one in the Steel Nuclear Bomber?
Was it another one we've talked about at least one
other time. Yeah, it's a great movie. What are we
up to? Like ten thousand and ninety podcast? So far?
I think so. We've mentioned four games in about half
of the I would say, uh, in three Matthew young
Matthew Broderick, although he still looks exactly the same thing,
(19:07):
it really does, doesn't He doesn't age. Sarah Jessica Parker
has an aged either. Yeah, but if you look at
square pegs her versus Sex in the City her, there
was quite a difference. Okay, although I still don't find
her very attractive. To be honest, I'm gonna hear from
the ladies on that one. And Sara Jessica Parker, Dude,
if she listen to the show, they'd be great. You're
really hot, Sarah Jessica Parker. Yeah. Josh and war Games, Uh,
(19:32):
Matthew Broderick um hacks into the Norad system and to
play some games, and what he chooses to play is
thermonuclear war and the computer constantly at the end of
the movie, you know, it's like the only way to
win is not to play, which is actually correct, and
that is right on the money. It's um. It's also
akin to uh, an actual game theory exercise called the
(19:55):
prisoners Dilemma. Yeah, that's cool, tell us about that, Josh, Well,
the prisoners Lemma. Let's say you have two accomplices in
a crime that are separated. Let's say to you and me,
all right, so Chuck, you're being interrogated in room A.
Josh did it. That's well, we're both in trouble, right, Um, Well,
I'm in trouble and you're not right. But let's say
we're we're actually buddies and we like each other outside
(20:17):
of the podcast be and we we've committed a jewel heist.
So we've been caught, but nobody said anything yet. You're
an interrogation room A. I'm an interrogation room beat. The
problem is I have no idea what you're doing. You
have no idea what I'm doing. If you implicate me,
I go to jail. You go free. If I implicate you,
(20:37):
you go to jail. I go free. We both implicate
each other, we both go to jail. What's the best
option here to not say a word? Not say a word,
and then either one of us is implicated and we
both go free. That's a classic TV and movie thing too.
In the you always split them up, and you and
you always go into the one room and say your
partners in there singing like a bird. Yeah, Willie. Yeah,
(21:00):
see Rocky's gonna fixture saying, and then all of a
sudden they get that prisoner too or that criminal to
uh rat out the other guy because they think that
they're being read at, which is stupid. Man. They should
just keep your here's the lesson to our younger viewers.
Keep your mouth shut. Yeah, that's good. That's always good.
Never wrat people out. All right, So if you want
(21:22):
to read more about mutual assured destruction, frankly, I think
that I wrote this a little flowery, but it was
one of my my UM favorite ones. It was just interesting.
You can type in mutual assured destruction on the cite
will also bring up UM Tom Sheaves game theory article,
which is definitely worth reading as well. Uh and you
(21:44):
will type that into the handy search bar, which means
that it's time for listener mail. Indeed, Josh, I'm gonna
call this our first genuine unicorn email, all right, sort
of what about the ones where people send a pictures
of unicorns? It's not genuine? Okay, that's falsome. Hi, Chuck
(22:04):
and Josh, you mentioned that you wanted some unicorn stories,
and I couldn't resist sending me this one. It might
be a good lead into a podcast on traditional medicines.
This alam makes sense in a minute. I just got
back from a trip to Vietnam, and as a part
of my trip, I went into the hill country and
northern Vietnam called Sapa. This is where many minority tribes
are residing, and part of their way of life is
(22:27):
selling their wares to tourists and offering homestays. Kind of
cool um. After a day hike, a group of us
ended up at a family home and they served us
a delicious dinner of traditional food and something they called
happy water. I liked some of them. Some made rice wine.
You can imagine why it's called nappy water. Got us
a little giggly to begin with, and what really got
(22:48):
us going was seeing the lady of the house nonchalantly
walk out of the kitchen with a cow's horn stuck
to her forehead as if she were a unicorn. When
we finally contained ourselves, we all felt like sleps because
our guide explained that this was a traditional way of
getting rid of headaches. You put on the you put
the horn in the fire, you brand it to your forehead,
(23:09):
and then after a short time, you take it off
for the next two weeks you have to run. Uh,
you have the round red mark on your forehead. Maybe
it hurt more than the headache and therefore took remind
uf of it. I'm not sure, doesn't that sounds like anyway?
This is my semi unicorn story. Thanks for the great
podcast from Ang. It was a Canadian listening in Indonesia
(23:32):
and say Vietnam again Vietnam and am well, thanks Ang
for that. UM. Actually, yes, that is definitely the closest
thing to an actual unicorn UM listener mail we've gotten
so far. Indeed, if you have any Cold War stories
or any unicorn stories, or your name is Ang or
contains those letters in that same arrangement, send us an email.
(23:54):
You can send it to Stuff podcast at how stuff
works dot com. For more on this and thousands of
other topics, visit how stuff works dot com. Want more
how stuff works, check out our blogs on the how
stuff works dot com home page. M
Welcome to Stuff you should know from House Stuff Works
dot com. Hey, and welcome to the podcast. I'm Josh
Clark with me as always as the lovely and talented
Charles W. Chuckers Bryant. Hi, Hey, Chuck. Hi. See you
switched hats uh from When to Win from the Chicago
(00:24):
Bears hat to the Atlanta Braves hate. That was yesterday
today today. You're a man of many hats, John, many
fan allegiances. I'm not a Bears fan. You know what
that was all done? Punkin's Yes, punkin Chunkin, Yes, Josh.
We are going to mention once again. The Discovery Channel
are awesome. Parent company is releasing two television shows on
(00:45):
Thanksgiving night. Don't confuse people, Chuck. They're gonna be on
the Science Channel well on Thursday, November twenty six, which
is Thanksgiving. That's a dead dead turkeys that day, The
Road to Punkin Chunkin and Punkin Chunkin Right. The Road
to Punkin Chunking comes on eight pm Eastern Time on
the Science Channel, followed by the Real punkin Chunking at
(01:06):
nine pm Eastern. I would follow it up with a
show called The Road from Punkin Film Right Going back
home after punkin chunking in Delaware. No less, So that's
that right? Sure? Alrighty so Chuck, Yes, Josh, Um, this
I have like a little this seems vaguely familiar. We're
talking about mutual assured destruction. Okay, well, how does that
(01:27):
seem familiar? Because I did it with Candice many many
moons ago on Stuffy miss in history class, back when
it was called factor fiction. Dude, that was another lifetime,
wasn't it. It really was. I have so many more
gray hairs now, and like my posture is much more
stooped the Seattle slump I do. Actually, nice one, Chuck.
(01:49):
We've talked about this, I think here there we've mentioned it.
Remember we did a podcast on how easy is it
is steal a nuclear bomb? We concluded that if the
Jamaicans are buying it and you steal it en route
to Maka, you can probably get away with it. Um.
This podcast is specifically on a Cold War strategic doctrine
(02:10):
called mutual issued destruction, which was abbreviated as MAD appropriately enough. Yeah,
it's funny. It's like it's scary as I'll get out,
but it's also comforting in the same breath, it's weird.
Well yeah, because I mean, if you think about it,
you and I grew up we were Cold War babies,
and we grew up with the express knowledge that at
any moment nuclear wark breakout and if that happened, everyone
(02:34):
on the planet was debt. And like, that's how we
were raised, like kids that were born like what in
like mid eighties today, which is just nuts to me
that there's people walking around that are sentient that we're
born in the mid eighties. But kids that were born
in the mid eighties and after did not grow up
with that specter looming over him, and I imagine are
completely different people personality wise than like you and I. Well,
(02:55):
that's like everyone else on our staff almost agreed. Do
you ever think about that? I did not. There are
a few old folks like us, although I'm much older
than you. Obviously. You definitely point out checks wearing right
now a Jeane jacket with a sharpie marker used to
to do the Journey logo on the back. It's pretty
pretty cool. Check you burnout. Um, So Chuck, as I
(03:19):
was saying, we grew up as as Cold War kids, um,
and every once in a while you have to stop
and think, why didn't the US and the USS are
blow one another up? Are you asking me that? Yeah, well,
let's talk about the Cold world, because the answer is
the end of the podcast, all right, So let's save that,
all right, The Cold War, Josh, I had a couple
(03:40):
of really scary moments. If you want to talk about those,
I do. The Cuban missile crisis was a pretty tense
a couple of weeks. Probably the first one in nine two,
President Kennedy threatened to strike once he found out that
Russia had moved or I guess the Soviet Union had
moved missiles to Cuba, and we're pointing them at his face.
And Cuba seems like a world away, but it's really
(04:02):
just ninety miles off the southern coast of Florida, a
short boat ride, right, And so if you have nuclear,
long range nuclear warheads pointed at the US, they can
hit their mark, probably as far as Kansas City, let's say,
and they could definitely hit temperature. That was a scary
couple of weeks. Sure it was because there was a standoff. Basically,
(04:23):
we were saying, hey, we're gonna nuke you if you
don't remove these missiles and the Soviet Union said, oh yeah,
well we'll nuke you back. And actually you can, actually
you can. You can point to this is perhaps the
beginning of the mad doctrine. And the other scary one
was in weird Chuck, This actually happened like several times.
(04:48):
This is probably the worst. That's some bad communication going on.
What happened was, Uh, nora Ad got some information that
the Soviet Union had launched two thousand, two hundred and
twenty nuclear missiles our way. So chuck, Yeah, UM in
nora Ad, which is like our the command center for
our missile system defense deep in Shyenne Mountain in Colorado. UM,
(05:13):
on some computer screen, some guys computer screen that that
tracks UM Soviet missile movement. All of a sudden, it
was just peppered with missiles that were coming this way.
And and UM National Security Director of Brasniski. Nice jobs that, right,
I think it's right. I can't remember a lot of continants.
(05:35):
And it's not that I can't remember, it's that I've
never heard it. Prasinski, We're going with Prasinski. Um, he
was alerted. It's pretty early in the morning, right, yeah,
two am. He was alerted and woken up and they're like, hey,
there's a Soviet missile strike and all out missile strike,
twenty missiles coming our way, sir, and he is picking
(05:56):
up the phone to call President Carter, who I don't
know what Carter would have done. Carter wasn't exactly um,
the most militant president we've ever had. Great guy, great statesmen,
great diplomat. He might have pooped his pants and gone
back to bed, you know, maybe so um, but the
terrible um he he never got that phone call because
(06:19):
Brazinski was informed that, oh wait, it's a computer glitch.
They whacked the side of the monitor and it all corrected.
That said. What shocked me was it was a seven
minute window that we had to decide what to do. Well,
it's a long way from the Soviet Union to the US,
even by way of Alaska. Seven minutes. S Yeah, you
(06:40):
have to make up your mind in seven minutes whether
or not you're going to destroy the world. Basically, I'm saying,
you would think that it would be less than seven minutes. Okay,
so so, and I'm telling you like that was probably
the worst case. But that happened many times during the
course of the Cold War. And from what I understand,
the Soviets had similar incidents too, right, yeah, so we
have these incidents, we have the human missile crisis. Why
(07:03):
didn't either side pull the trigger? Because of the doctrine,
the mad doctrine basically, which indicates that everyone will die.
So the uh, you know, we blow everybody up on
both sides, So let's not do that, right, And the
U s SR In the United States could actually very
(07:23):
quickly from seven and nineteen forty one, both nations were
building up their nuclear arsenals, which is called nuclear proliferation. Right,
I think I got that out, um in the nuclear
proliferation Do you take that one for the rest of
the podcast. Okay, okay, okay, um? And uh they so
each side had this arsenal and we're keeping up in
(07:44):
step with one another. You know what. That's called nuclear parity,
which is ideally what you want. Strangely, yes, in this case,
you definitely do. So both sides had more than enough
nuclear missiles to wipe out not just the other side,
but the tire planet. Several times over. That's a really
important point. Several times over. Why would you need a
(08:08):
nuclear arsenal that could wipe out the world, the planet
several times over. Now, maybe if they destroyed some of
our weaponry with their strikes, that's part of it. But
another part of it is because if one side adds
a missile, you gotta add a missile. Well if you
if you're seeking nuclear parity, which is really important, um,
(08:28):
then you there can't be. It can't be out of whack.
How did they did they release all this information to
each other? Was it? No? It was intelligence guesses that
kind of stuff, Like all of a sudden, there's like
a metal hole in the ground in Wyoming that wasn't
there before. The Soviets probably assumed, well, they have a
new nuclear warhead there. They didn't I m each other
and say built new messile. L o O click you're
(08:51):
going to say that. I knew you were going to
say that. So both sides are building up their arsenal.
And early on, Chuck Um, I was reading another article
on game theory which will see plays into this, written
by our steem colleague and might be ff Tom sheeve Um,
and he talks about how early on, apparently Eisenhower, who
is uh what, the second president to have the bomb,
(09:14):
but really the first president to manage like an amassed
nuclear arsenal. He yeah, he stopped worrying. Um. He looked
at them as like any other type of weapon, because
he was a military man. Um. But luckily there was
a game theorist named Thomas Shelling, who had the ear
of Eisenhower, managed to convince him that no, no, no,
(09:35):
these things are way way more powerful and destructive than
anything else in our arsenal. They exist in this in
this vacuum that has to be kept separate, and therefore
they should be viewed only as deterrence. And he managed
to change Eisenhower's view, and from that point on it
was the presence of a nuclear arsenal was a weapon
(09:57):
in and of itself. It was the preventative and not
only to nuclear war. But the point that did you
write this one, uh, The point that you made, which
I found interesting was that it also was a deterrent
to conventional war. Excellent point, because conventional war they're really after.
After the arms race, there was no such thing as
conventional war. No, and um, not between the U S
(10:18):
and the U S s R. Right, or a guaranteed
conventional war. It might start out that way, but it
would escalate and all of a sudden the button is
pushed at some point, right, because our nuclear arsenal did
exist and say, a vacuum outside of the rest of
our arsenal. But once you exhausted the rest of the arsenal,
then the inevitable conclusion was that that nuclear arsenal being deployed. Right,
(10:38):
or even if you didn't exhaust it, even if you
just said you just got man, let's just end this
game exactly. Um. So, as a result, the US and
the USS are just fought a Cold war. They never
directly engaged with another, but they fought one another through
proxy wars in places like Nicaragua in Afghanistan. Right, um
got a lot of good movies out of the Cold War,
definitely Rambo three and a good some good James Bond
(11:01):
movies in that time. I liked it when the Rooskies
were the villain. It was you like the James Bond
movies of the Cold Well, okay, yeah, maybe the early ones.
I'm thinking like Timothy Dalton there, yeah, I mean, trust me,
Roger Moore is kind of a laughable Bond. Now that
I'm older and looked back, You're crazy. Roger Moore is
the best team because we grew up with him. But
looking back, I mean, come on, Roger Moore was kind
of a dufe maybe, but that was I think that
(11:24):
was his director that he was working with. I kind
of like Pierce bros And and and he was good. He
was okay, I'm pretty hip on the Daniel Craig. He's
all right, Well that's the only direction they could take.
That really left blonde. No, just uh more realistic butt
kicking with fists and that kind of thing. You don't
think Moonraker was realistic, you know, he was constantly like
winking at the camp. Yeah, it's like Jonathan Strickland is
(11:50):
James Bond. I guess good one. Alright, so sorry about
the sidetrack. Yeah, what happened was we created a detent.
It wasn't like, Okay, we all have the same amount
of weapons, so we're BFFs now and it's all good.
It was a day tome, meaning it was sort of
a what's the best description, an uneasy truce. Yeah. Yeah, so, um, basically,
(12:11):
the US and the USSR had our weapons and we're
keeping an eye on one another, and anytime one added
a new missile or some new capability, the other scrambled
to catch up and vice versa, and we just basically
went to sleep with one eye open for the next
several decades. Right. Uh So, Josh, what two things have
to take place in order to achieve this uh weird stability. Well,
(12:33):
the weird stability the very fact that it existed. It's
not it wasn't an organic Um, it wasn't organically created
by the presence of nuclear weapons. Right. Um. Henry Kissinger,
who was Secretary of State throughout much of the Cold War, Um,
he actually was a huge fan of game theory. He
(12:53):
took a lot of game theory classes when he was
an underclassman at Harvard, and he kept in touch with
game theory and hung out with game theorists, and he
actually was one of the people who was responsible for
applying game theory to nuclear strategy. Yeah, and other people
kind of caught on and saw that there was a
lot of merit and validity to to viewing um, nuclear
(13:16):
strategy through game theory. Right. Um, So the two things
really are having that I'll answer my own question that
what's key is a to have the weapons to begin with.
And then, as Robert McNamara points out, the Defense Secretary
in nineteen sixties was that you have to believe that
the other guys actually has the cojones to pull the trigger, right,
(13:37):
And apparently both the US and the USS are like
to leak false information about how crazy their leaders were.
Do you remember how we were brought up viewing like
the Russians like they were all nuts, right, and they
would just push the button at any second. Yeah, they
wanted American blood. Apparently that was planted by the Russians,
because you have to believe that the other guy is
(13:59):
willing to strike and and not just create a first strike,
but definitely a counter strike as well. Right, sure, So
if you are assured that if you launch a first
strike that the next the other sides going to launch
a retaliatory strike, what you've just done by launching that
first strike is committed suicide. Pretty much. The basis of
(14:21):
mutual assured destruction is that nobody wants to die, right Okay? Yeah, yeah, okay?
And uh also at the time, I mean, at first,
the way the nuclear warheads um developed over the years
is pretty cool because, like you pointed out, at first,
it was just a big, huge, dopey bomb that would
(14:41):
just blow up everything. Yeah, have you seen pictures of
Fat Boy and Little Man. They really do they do?
The money would drop out of the back of a plane. Yeah,
did you know they weren't the same type of bomb.
Fat Man, which was dropped on Nagasaki was plutonium and
a Little Boy, which was dropped on Hiroshima was uranium. Interesting,
I didn't know that, and they were. They were working
(15:02):
on both of these. So basically we split the atom
in the like for the late thirties and all of
a sudden, we're just working on any kind of atomic
bomb we want nuts. So over the years though that
it became very precise and much more strategic, so you could, um,
let's say, send your nuclear warheads to specific military targets
at first, obviously to wipe out, you know, some of
(15:22):
that capability. Hold on, you're talking about escalation. Let's talk
about the nuclear proliferation. It wasn't just a ladder of escalation. Well,
hold on, let's talk about where the nukes were, right,
and so at the height of the Cold War, it
wasn't just missile silos and wyoming and you know this Ukraine,
it was um, there was the European theater, Eastern and
(15:42):
Western we had nuclear warheads all over the place there
um at any given time, both the Soviets and the
US had aircraft in the air at any point in
time with nuclear with nukes, right, we had nuclear submarines
all over the globe, so lancey and air both sides
had it covered. Right. So okay, we're the world is
completely covered with thermonuclear devices, very high tech delivery systems
(16:08):
specific and both sides have enough to wipe the other
one off the planet several times. We're at a day time, right,
So what happens if somebody does launch a first strike
because it's no longer a holocaust where we're just shooting
missiles anymore, we have the capability to launch precise surgical strike. Well,
there will be a counter strike, there is. But this
(16:30):
is where the ladder of escalation you were talking about
comes in. Well, yeah, you like in it to a
chess game, there's a strike than a counter strike, and
then you know increasing levels of of strikes as they
climb up the ladder. Right now, So basically, yeah, it's
like trading punches, right, right, So you start out, you
start out soft, and I hit you. I don't you
(16:52):
bring it all from the beginning. Then I'm really glad
you weren't at the helm of the United States or
the uss are during the Cold War. But let's say
let's say we were evenly matched, right, and I punch you,
you punched me a little harder, I punch you a
little harder, and then uh, it keeps going on until
finally one of us like, okay, stop. But what we've
done is we've escalated the damage we're doing to one another.
(17:16):
But there's something very important that that's easily overlooked in
that trade of punches. There's a moment that comes after
each punch where someone might quit, where somebody has the
options to quit right or trade another punch. And if
you trade another punch, you're gonna escalate. Right. So if
in the case of nuclear arms that are real precise
at this point, they take out a few of our
(17:38):
military bases, we take a few of their's are out,
and all of a sudden, one of the leaders steps
back and says, wait a minute, we're gonna annihilate everybody.
We have to stop. You win, right exactly. Um, And
what's crazy is it's like the fact that there would
even be a retaliatory strike is all based on saving face,
which is kind of disgusting in and of itself. But um, yeah,
(18:01):
both sides had this kind of agreement. I can't remember
it was called where it's It's like in the ladder
of escalation. First to start with like say nuclear silo,
and then you the next the next wrong on the
ladder is you know, actual troops, right, and then the
next wrong after that is like maybe a rural area.
Then after that it is like a city, and it
(18:21):
keeps you going and I aming each other between give up.
Yet both sides knew what was coming next. It was
part of the ladder of escalation. Yeah, luckily we never
engaged in that. Luckily there was no instant messaging back
then too. I know it would have been fun or
it could have saved us that well, I guess we
we were saved. But chuck, um, I know you recognize
the ladder of escalation because your favorite movie or one
(18:44):
of them had this factor heavily into four games. What
did we talk about this one in the Steel Nuclear Bomber?
Was it another one we've talked about at least one
other time. Yeah, it's a great movie. What are we
up to? Like ten thousand and ninety podcast? So far?
I think so. We've mentioned four games in about half
of the I would say, uh, in three Matthew young
Matthew Broderick, although he still looks exactly the same thing,
(19:07):
it really does, doesn't He doesn't age. Sarah Jessica Parker
has an aged either. Yeah, but if you look at
square pegs her versus Sex in the City her, there
was quite a difference. Okay, although I still don't find
her very attractive. To be honest, I'm gonna hear from
the ladies on that one. And Sara Jessica Parker, Dude,
if she listen to the show, they'd be great. You're
really hot, Sarah Jessica Parker. Yeah. Josh and war Games, Uh,
(19:32):
Matthew Broderick um hacks into the Norad system and to
play some games, and what he chooses to play is
thermonuclear war and the computer constantly at the end of
the movie, you know, it's like the only way to
win is not to play, which is actually correct, and
that is right on the money. It's um. It's also
akin to uh, an actual game theory exercise called the
(19:55):
prisoners Dilemma. Yeah, that's cool, tell us about that, Josh, Well,
the prisoners Lemma. Let's say you have two accomplices in
a crime that are separated. Let's say to you and me,
all right, so Chuck, you're being interrogated in room A.
Josh did it. That's well, we're both in trouble, right, Um, Well,
I'm in trouble and you're not right. But let's say
we're we're actually buddies and we like each other outside
(20:17):
of the podcast be and we we've committed a jewel heist.
So we've been caught, but nobody said anything yet. You're
an interrogation room A. I'm an interrogation room beat. The
problem is I have no idea what you're doing. You
have no idea what I'm doing. If you implicate me,
I go to jail. You go free. If I implicate you,
(20:37):
you go to jail. I go free. We both implicate
each other, we both go to jail. What's the best
option here to not say a word? Not say a word,
and then either one of us is implicated and we
both go free. That's a classic TV and movie thing too.
In the you always split them up, and you and
you always go into the one room and say your
partners in there singing like a bird. Yeah, Willie. Yeah,
(21:00):
see Rocky's gonna fixture saying, and then all of a
sudden they get that prisoner too or that criminal to
uh rat out the other guy because they think that
they're being read at, which is stupid. Man. They should
just keep your here's the lesson to our younger viewers.
Keep your mouth shut. Yeah, that's good. That's always good.
Never wrat people out. All right, So if you want
(21:22):
to read more about mutual assured destruction, frankly, I think
that I wrote this a little flowery, but it was
one of my my UM favorite ones. It was just interesting.
You can type in mutual assured destruction on the cite
will also bring up UM Tom Sheaves game theory article,
which is definitely worth reading as well. Uh and you
(21:44):
will type that into the handy search bar, which means
that it's time for listener mail. Indeed, Josh, I'm gonna
call this our first genuine unicorn email, all right, sort
of what about the ones where people send a pictures
of unicorns? It's not genuine? Okay, that's falsome. Hi, Chuck
(22:04):
and Josh, you mentioned that you wanted some unicorn stories,
and I couldn't resist sending me this one. It might
be a good lead into a podcast on traditional medicines.
This alam makes sense in a minute. I just got
back from a trip to Vietnam, and as a part
of my trip, I went into the hill country and
northern Vietnam called Sapa. This is where many minority tribes
are residing, and part of their way of life is
(22:27):
selling their wares to tourists and offering homestays. Kind of
cool um. After a day hike, a group of us
ended up at a family home and they served us
a delicious dinner of traditional food and something they called
happy water. I liked some of them. Some made rice wine.
You can imagine why it's called nappy water. Got us
a little giggly to begin with, and what really got
(22:48):
us going was seeing the lady of the house nonchalantly
walk out of the kitchen with a cow's horn stuck
to her forehead as if she were a unicorn. When
we finally contained ourselves, we all felt like sleps because
our guide explained that this was a traditional way of
getting rid of headaches. You put on the you put
the horn in the fire, you brand it to your forehead,
(23:09):
and then after a short time, you take it off
for the next two weeks you have to run. Uh,
you have the round red mark on your forehead. Maybe
it hurt more than the headache and therefore took remind
uf of it. I'm not sure, doesn't that sounds like anyway?
This is my semi unicorn story. Thanks for the great
podcast from Ang. It was a Canadian listening in Indonesia
(23:32):
and say Vietnam again Vietnam and am well, thanks Ang
for that. UM. Actually, yes, that is definitely the closest
thing to an actual unicorn UM listener mail we've gotten
so far. Indeed, if you have any Cold War stories
or any unicorn stories, or your name is Ang or
contains those letters in that same arrangement, send us an email.
(23:54):
You can send it to Stuff podcast at how stuff
works dot com. For more on this and thousands of
other topics, visit how stuff works dot com. Want more
how stuff works, check out our blogs on the how
stuff works dot com home page. M
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Josh Clark
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