Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Hey there, before we
dive in, if you like what you're
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So what if I told you that thesystem that alerts millions of
(00:48):
Americans to tornadoes, amberalerts or even nuclear threats
was built on the bones of theCold War paranoia, hijacked
radio waves and a bit ofbureaucratic luck.
Welcome back to Fully Modulatedof bureaucratic luck.
Welcome back to Fully Modulated, the podcast where signal meets
story.
I'm Tyler Woodward, a seniorbroadcast engineer for a network
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of public media stations.
I've been in this industrysince 2014 and hold a CBNT
certification through theSociety of Broadcast Engineers.
This show is all about peelingback the layers of the broadcast
industry, especially for thosewho've always been curious on
how everything really worksbehind the scenes.
Today we're exploring a strange, tense yet fascinating history
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that led to the emergency alertsystem as we know it.
The emergency alert systemdidn't begin as a way to warn
you about a missing child or aweather event.
It began as CONORAD, short forControl of Electromagnetic
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Radiation, developed in the1950s.
During the height of the ColdWar, the US government feared
that Soviet bombers could useAmerican broadcast signals to
navigate toward targets.
The response A plan to shutdown most radio stations during
an attack and switch others tocertain AM frequencies 640 and
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1240 kHz on a rotating basis.
It was chaos, preventiondisguised as control.
This system was mandatory.
Every AM radio station had toparticipate, with custom signs
posted next to transmittersshowing how to switch over.
It was a radical idea Controlthe very airwaves to prevent an
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attack.
But from the start it wasriddled with technical issues
and operator confusion.
Many stations didn't switchquickly enough, others had
signal interference problems orfailed entirely.
By the 1960s, conrad was alreadyfeeling outdated.
There was no provision forlocal emergencies.
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In a country growing morereliant on television, the
radio-only model was limited.
The need for something moreflexible and less
military-minded was becomingobvious.
In 1963, the EmergencyBroadcast System, or otherwise
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known as EBS, replaced Conorad.
This marked a turning point.
The system shifted fromnational defense to public
communication.
Ebs was designed to let thepresident address the nation
within 10 minutes of anemergency.
While that top-down commandstructure remained central, the
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scope expanded Suddenly.
It wasn't just about nuclearwar.
It could be used for naturaldisasters and civil emergencies.
Ebs introduced attentionsignals and scripts.
Broadcasters now had access tothe tools to interrupt
programming and broadcastofficial emergency information.
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But here's the catch While thesystem was technically in place
for decades, it was almost neverused by the president.
In fact, many people who workedin radio through the 70s and 80s
never saw a real activation.
One reason the system wasclunky.
It relied on telephone lines,manual procedures and lots and
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lots of human intervention.
There were tests weekly andmonthly, but the real alerts
were rare.
Ebs was built with goodintentions, but it often felt
more like a formality than afunctioning warning tool.
One of the most infamousincidents in EBS history
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happened on February 20, 1971 at9.33 am Eastern Time.
An incorrect activation codewas transmitted from NORAD to
broadcasters across the country.
The message told stations tocease regular programming and
wait for a follow-up, but thatfollow-up never came.
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The code used hatefulness.
It was a real activation code,not a test.
Stations scrambled, some cutprogramming, others ignored it,
assuming it was an error.
The Associated Press even ran abulletin about the alert.
The confusion lasted for nearly40 minutes before officials
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realized the mistake and sentthe cancellation notice.
This event shook trust in thesystem.
Investigations revealed thatthe wrong tape had been pulled
by mistake.
And it wasn't just a wrongmessage.
It was a real deal.
The fallout led to tighterprocedures.
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Better training and increasedscrutiny of EBS were undeniable.
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Engineers and policymakersrecognized the need for
automation.
Manual relay chains and paperscripts weren't going to cut it
in the era of increase inweather volability and
fast-moving threats.
Enter the groundwork for theemergency alert system, which
arrived in 1997.
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The EAS was envisioned as adigital system.
Alerts would be relayedautomatically using the specific
area message encoding or sametones, allowing for precision
targeting and fasterdissemination.
Allowing for precisiontargeting and faster
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dissemination.
No more relying solely onoperators to catch faxes or
follow codes.
The system was meant to beproactive and reliable.
The vision was driven not justby technology but by a changing
threat landscape.
The Cold War was ending, butdomestic threats like hurricanes
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, terrorism and missing childrenwere becoming more central in
the national psyche.
Emergency communication neededto modernize.
A major feature of the emergencyalert system was its ability to
support local authorities.
State and local governmentscould now issue alerts through
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the same infrastructure.
This decentralized model gavemore control to regions and
broadcasters.
Suddenly, a county officialcould alert a certain area about
a flood or even a chemicalspill, without relying on
Washington.
That localization wasn't justabout geography.
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It was about trust.
Local broadcasters, often seenas a familiar and reliable voice
, became essential partners inthe emergency response.
Their involvement also droveimprovements in EAS technology,
as stations invested inequipment like EAS decoders and
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encoders that could respondautomatically.
This marked a shift from theCold War era top-down broadcast
system to a more flexiblebottom-up approach centered
around the needs of thecommunities.
In the 1990s, fema took a moreactive role in emergency
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communications, working closelywith the FCC and the National
Weather Service.
The formal birth of the EAS in1997 was the result of years of
policy work, technical planningand interagency collaboration.
And inter-agency collaboration.
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The FCC mandated participationin national alerts but left
local and state messages asoptional.
Stations were required toinstall EAS-capable equipment,
and weekly and monthly testsbecame standardized across the
country.
Over time, public alertingsystems like NOAA, weather Radio
and IPALS would integrate withEAS, creating a layered
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emergency ecosystem.
This modernization effortwasn't just technical, it was
cultural.
Broadcasters began to seethemselves as essential
emergency communicators, notjust conduits for entertainment
seek communicators not justconduits for entertainment.
Speaker 2 (10:14):
This is a coordinated
monthly test of the broadcast
stations of your area.
Equipment that can quickly warnyou during emergencies is being
tested.
If this had been an actualemergency, such as a tornado or
flash flood or a civil emergencywarning, official messages
would have followed the alerttone.
This concludes this test of theEmergency Alert System.
Speaker 1 (10:57):
If you're enjoying
this deep dive, do me a huge
favor.
Like the show, follow along andshare it with a colleague or
maybe a curious friend.
If you've got 30 seconds, leavea review.
It really helps others discover.
Fully Modulated, the emergencyalert system we know today
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didn't arrive fully formed.
It's a patchwork of legacyideas and hard lessons learned.
Conal Rad taught us that fearcan drive innovation but also
lead to impractical solutions.
Ebs reminded us that humanerror must be accounted for in
an emergency plan.
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Eas is more robust but stillevolving.
The introduction of CAP, commonAlerting Protocol the growing
influence of cell phone alertsand the ever-present challenge
of public trust continue toshape how EAS operates.
The history isn't justcuriosity.
It's a blueprint thathistorical context matters.
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Engineers who understand thesystem's origins are better
equipped to maintain and improveit, and listeners who
understand how alerts get hereare more likely to trust and act
upon them.
One of the underappreciatedimpacts of this historical
journey is how it shapedbroadcast culture.
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Testing is now second nature.
Engineers know what to listenfor.
Stations plan for EAScompliance in their budgets and
their training.
It's no longer an afterthought,it's part of the broadcast DNA.
This wasn't always the case Backin the Conrad days and early
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EBS days.
Tests were irregular andtraining was well more or less
inconsistent.
The repeated missteps over thedecades helped create a culture
of diligence.
Helped create a culture ofdiligence.
Today's EAS alerts may stilloccasionally glitch, but the
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system is monitored, logged andreviewed constantly.
Broadcast engineers like myselfplay a quiet but crucial role
in this safety net.
We're the ones installing theencoders, wiring the relays and
reviewing the logs.
No-transcript.
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While the 1971 false alert wasinfamous, it wasn't the last.
The 2018 Hawaii Missile Alert,sent to cell phones via the
Wireless Emergency Alert System,wea, reminded the public and
the industry of how fragiletrust can be.
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The panic that ensued wasn'tjust about the message.
It was about the system thatallowed it to happen.
In the aftermath, both FEMA andthe FCC doubled down on process
improvements.
That included better userinterfaces, more verification
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steps and new trainingrequirements, but it also
reignited the interest in theEAS role as the final failsafe
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for getting the word out quicklyand correctly.
Today we walk through the originstory of emergency alerting in
the United States, from Cold Warcountermeasures to modern
decentralized digital systems.
Eas didn't emerge overnight.
It grew, it stumbled and itadapted, just like the world
around it.
Next episode we'll go insidethe tech, the gears and the
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wires that make the system work.
If you've ever wondered how thesignal gets from FEMA to your
FM radio in seconds, you don'twant to miss that one.
And hey, if you're a broadcastengineer with a good EAS story
or even a test that wentsideways, I want to hear about
it.
Text into the show using thelink in the episode description.
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We'll be right back, like whatyou heard.
(16:21):
Tap that follow button, leave arating and share the show with
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It helps keep the signal strong.
Speaker 2 (16:39):
This concludes our
broadcast day Click.